There can be no doubt about the existence of two other things in the universe, besides myself. I know that I personally have certain a priori. I imagine certain things to be certain ways. It is impossible to verify my perceptions, because any evidence I Inight have for or against them are merely other perceptions. Memory must also be considered a sort of perception. It seems to come from something internal rather than external, but like sensory perception, it is not conciousness. The world as I can deduce it in its' most basic form consists of my conciousness, and everything else. I can't draw any definate conclusions about the nature of the 'everything else'. To amend that: I can draw the conclusion that there is something else. Even more than that I know that there must be at least two other things.

Imagine for a moment that you have gone through your life without ever having seen a certain shade of green or a certain tone.

If you were to see a spectrum missing this tone you would certainly notice its' absence, even though up to this point you had never hat} any direct experience of it. Simalerly you would notice the absence of this note from a scale. This is because we are capable of drawing inferences from simaler, related ev~nts\_ On a more sophisticated level we might expect an apple to fall rather than rise, even though we had never seen this particular apple fall. Or we might expect a person to become angry at a certain opinion because he has responded that way to simelar opinions.

Drawing from this reasoning I know I have had at least two perceptions, or rather moments of perception. I imagine a variety of colors and sounds and textures and so on. I would not be able to imagine something had 1 not experienced something.

Just as a person born without the optic centers of her brain



could not imagine what sight is, I could not imagine perceptions without having had one. Further I could not imagine a variety of perceptions without having had at least two, as a means of generating more. I could with the two moments of perception generate more, as I have demonstrated by showing we can deduce things we have not actually percieved.

These moments of perception must include more than merely sight, s011nd, smell, and the senses. They must include emotions and memories also. It is clear that sensory perceptions may be dedused from other sensory perceptions, but it may require further discussion about memory and emotion. Emotion is much like sensory perception; that is it weighs on our conciousness, without actually being central to conciousness. The variety of emotions which I feel can be drawn from those which were the ones I actually percieved. It may be that more than two emotions are necessary, from which to deduce the others. I say only at least two. The same will apply to sensory perc~ption and memory~. Memory is like emotion in that it is a non-external perception. However memory goes further than this; memory is of something, either memory of sensory perception, or memory of emotion, or even memory of memory. This memory may certainly be a memory of a real or imagined perception, but memory must have been part of the original percertions. Had we experienced our original perceptions only of sensory information and emotion, we could create more of these, but we could not remember them. Were this the case we would have had to generate the perception of memory from something unlike it. This is like someone without optic nerves trying to imaline sighh as being like sound, which it isn't.



It is evident that the traditional argument, 'I think, therefore I exist', holds true. So at this point I know that I exist, and that two other things ('things' taken in a loose sense) exist. These two things mayor may not be in my perception or memory of It is quite concievable that my memories are exclusively perception. memories of perceptions which I have imagined sinse the original perceptions. It is also possible that my sensory perceptions, my emotional perceptions, and my perceptions of memory may not have occured in the same moments of perception. All that is strictly required is that I have had two of each of these types of perception at some moment of perception. Most people believe that most moments of perception reflect some sort of 'objective reality'. Few would contend that all moments of perception reflect this 'objectivity'. This is most noteworthy when discussing memory and dreams.

The major flaw with this discourse is that it may be that this particular moment of perception comes from something external, but it is the first (and perhaps only) of its' kind. It may also be that at some point I had one (but not more than one) moment of perception, and now I am reliving this moment in my imagination. It can also be shown that there is doubt as to the fact that 'I exist', as this could be considered ~ moment of perception indepenfient of its inpingment on conciousness. However, this possibility is unpleasant to consider so I shall stop here.