

observation that the use-values of objects are socially determined must be taken seriously. Marx himself, of course, makes this observation, though in a decidedly untheoretical way, as early as the 1848 Manuscripts and The Poverty of Philosophy (in the latter there is some famous quote to the effect that English workers require beer for sustenance where French workers require wine -- or something of this sort)

It is clear that ideological workers of various sorts, including "knowledge producers," expend human labor, and in the process consume and transform natural and produced objects. The carbon cores of pencils, for example, are transferred onto the surfaces of papers. However, just as clearly it is not these produced objects -- these filled notebooks, for example -- which primarily constitute the "produced" object of ideological work. Beyond saying a truism which yet seems false -- that ideological workers produce ideology -- we may claim that ideological workers produce labor-power, itself a commodity. This suggestion seems more plausible after we have pointed out that labor-power is never the potential of a generic laborer, but always the potential of, for example, an American laborer. Where a professor at a Bourgeois State University may play little role in creating the generic skills possessed by a given laborer, the former clearly plays a role in creating an American skilled laborer.

It may be useful to think of ideological labor as transformation of the "social world" -- just as material labor is a transformation of the "material world." In either case actual human labor is expended by the labor, but in the former there is no literal object toward which it is directed. However, if we slightly reify society -- if we think of it as possessing traditions, institutions, ideas with an autonomous existence, structured patterns of interaction, practices, etc. -- then we can find an object toward which ideological labor is directed. Ideological labor seeks to transform, propagate or create traditions, patterns of interaction, institutions, and all the rest. The "object" of ideological labor includes at least those "things" which Althusser calls 'ideological state apparatuses [sic]'

Althusser correctly writes the following.

The reproduction of labour power thus reveals as its sine qua non not only the reproduction of its 'skills' but also the reproduction of its subjection (?) to the ruling ideology or of the 'practice' of that ideology, with the proviso that it is in the forms and under the forms of ideological subjection that provision is made for the reproduction of the skills of labour power. ("Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses" in Lenin and Philosophy. p. 133)

What we are to understand here is that the particular conditioning which the laborer is subject to, the beliefs which she has about the actual productive activity she engages in, are ideological. These beliefs are not only those which broadly justify the relations of production, the ideology of the market place, religious ideology, etc.; they include the

The "Production" of Ideology.

Perhaps it is reasonable to claim that ideological workers really are productive workers. It is not only in Capitalism that ideology is necessary for the modes of production. But when in Capitalist systems, ideological workers (including knowledge-producers) produce a commodity, namely the labor-power of a laborer under a specific ideological subjection. We must notice that labor-power can only exist in the potential of such a laborer, and as we have said, never in the potential of some imagined generic laborer. Even so, Marx

ordinary "knowledge" she has about the way production is carried out -- the function of a certain machine and this sort of thing.

Ideology.

A word should probably be said at this point about the nature of ideology. Many persons have used the word 'ideology' in many different ways, both in terms of its definition and in terms of its rhetorical or emotive force. I wish for the word to carry as little emotive force as is possible. As for the rhetic acts I wish to use it for -- these should be, as nearly as possible, non-theoretical descriptions of social matters. The thetic acts will involve something like the following definition of 'ideology'. An ideology is simply a systematic set of beliefs which justify, explain, or lend coherence to ways of acting (the distinction 'rhetic'/'thetic' is much like the distinction illocution/locution. When we say 'thetic', however, the issues of reference and truth to not come to mind. Nor when we say 'rhetic' do we suppose that there is a conventional procedure to perform the act we do. Our possible illocutionary acts are perhaps enumerable, not so with rhetic acts).

The sense I give to 'ideology' will include matters such as religious doctrines and government laws; also though it will include scientific theories and instruction manuals. Clearly, given my general notions I am committed to seeing beliefs as material things of some sort, probably textual things. Hence

excludes those who reproduce labor-power from the category of 'productive labor'. Let me write about the intermediate object of "knowledge-producers" -- for if such persons do create labor-power in its specificity, they do so by means of creating an intermediate "object": *knowledge*.

Remember the manner in which ideological work has been spoken of. Ideological work was conceived of as being a transformation of the "social world" -- institutions (assuming these to include traditions, structured patterns of interaction, practices, language-games and so on) are

I am committed to viewing ideologies as collections of these material things. All sorts of questions may be asked about how we identify, count, and study ideologies in a fully physicalist manner. I am quite willing to issue promises on providing these answers at a future time, though clearly can do no more right here. One additional point to be indicated is that I do not much care to speak of ideologies as being true or false; as I consider the notions of truth and falsity to be, if not incoherent, incompatible with materialism (notwithstanding all sorts of supposed materialist talking about "Truth" -- both Quine and Lenin, for example).

How may the reader be brought to accept my admittedly broad sense of 'ideology'? I hope the following motivation will be efficacious. Above I made, though rejected, a distinction between science and ideology on a parallel basis with the distinction between causal and justificatory explanations. I reject this distinction on the grounds that it gives the wrong meaning to 'science' -- science as an institution does not merely concern itself with causal explanations. However, this distinction is right in that it defines 'ideology' as 'justificatory explanation'. This really does pick out the generally right sense of 'ideology'. However, we had better notice that justificatory explanations often, even usually, include significant causal elements. A theological explanation which starts off explaining some bit of human affairs with, "because this is the best of all possible worlds,"

created, modified and simply propagated through the efforts of ideological workers. *Knowledge* is one of these institutions in the sense that there are institutional prescriptions, proscriptions and circumscriptions as to whom knowledge may be ascribed to, and in what circumstances. Knowledge-producers are just those individuals who create, modify and propagate these particular institutions as a vocation (we all do so on an amateur basis). The collection of just those institutions surrounding knowledge/truth ascription lacks a name. I propose to call this collection of institutions simply *know-*

may nonetheless follow with a great mass of detail about the causal antecedents and causal laws by which a state of affairs came about.

Religious doctrines, government laws and other traditional ideological systems do give justificatory answers, at least implicitly. My sense of ideology encompasses these. However, instruction manuals also do so. If any "why" question may be said to be answered by an instruction manual it is, 'why is (are) this object (these objects) as it is (they are)?' The answer given by an instruction manual is justificatory: 'because certain kinds of transformations can be made on the object, or certain kinds of uses made of it.' A different, causal, answer could be given which would explain, step by step, the production process which the object went through. A suggestion of this causal explanation is often present in an instruction manual. An instruction manual may, for example, read 'our buyers searched the world to find the finest materials from which to construct this object' -- and such a search may actually have causally anteceded the creation of the object before us.

Very briefly, why not say that science gives causal explanations as its defining feature? I do not wish to seem recalcitrant here, but the causal explanations which science gives are not its central feature. In order for a scientific claim to gain currency it must be published. Publishers rarely

ledge -- though mark the word by italics when it is used in this manner.

Knowledge as social relation.

A knowledge is not a commodity. However, *knowledge*, like commodity, is a social relation. Just as a commodity may congeal into a material object, so may a knowledge -- though in either case this is inessential. In our Capitalist social formations, when an object is the embodiment of a knowledge it is likely to simultaneously be the embodiment of a commodity. For example, the same book which

ask a scientific author, 'why does nature behave thusly?' Instead they usually ask, 'why should I publish your article?' The latter question demands a justificatory answer. I will not claim that the former question is never asked in the scientific institution -- it is asked. However, the stage at which truth is socially created is that where a claim is somehow made public. In order for this to occur, a scientist must provide a series of the right justificatory answers to a series of ritualistically prescribed questions. These answers have a great deal more to do with CV's and citations than with the behavior of the basic objects of a particular discipline.

Ideology and science/knowledge.

Now is a good point to write a few words on ideology and science -- or what amounts to the same thing, on ideology and knowledge. I have written at length previously (in "A non-epistemological approach to knowledge") on this topic. At that time my approach was wedded to Althusser's conception of "areas of relative autonomy". If ideology can be considered an area of relative autonomy within the social totality, then knowledge/science can be considered an area of relative autonomy within ideology.

The sense of this latter relative autonomy is that knowledge-producers have identifiable positions (both in the figurative spatial sense, and in the sense of vocation), and engage in activities which are in some ways distinct from

embodies a piece of scientific knowledge is a saleable commodity in which use-value and value are fused.

I mention this duality of use-value and value because I wish to warn the reader against supposing that a book's embodiment of a piece of scientific knowledge is solely part of its use-value. We might carelessly imagine that *knowledge* is embodied in a given book in virtue of the possibility of reading it and coming to share its author's knowledge, or the like. This is not so; and is not so specifically because it reifies the social relation *knowledge* -- it supposes the

those of other ideological workers. For example, scientists will be considered knowledge-producers while law-makers will not -- although they each are ideological workers. The distinctness will lie primarily in the structure of institutional relations in which knowledge-producers are placed, rather than in any distinctness in the actual motor/kinetic activities which knowledge-producers engage in. I still believe this sketch of a framework.

The polysemy of 'knowledge'.

Two things are worth noting. (1) One is that the word 'knowledge', even in ordinary usage, has at least two related senses. In the one sense we traditionally say that knowledge is justified belief, or something to this effect (with all due respects to Mr. Gettier); in the other we traditionally say that knowledge is some physical or social realization of this belief, e.g. a text. These senses correspond to two ways of looking at knowledge (or knowledge-talk) which I shall find important. Under one inspection, knowledge-talk plays a certain rhetorical function -- and under knowledge-talk we must include use of the words 'truth', 'fact', and others. Chiefly, a certain emphasis is added to an assertion by knowledge--talk. We are more forceful in saying 'I know X' than in merely saying 'X' (most of the time). Under a second inspection, *knowledge* can be seen as an institutional reality of our society -- there are distributions of expertise, research institutions, controls and regulations over publication at

social relation is in the thing itself.

Use-value is specifically that which is excluded from the (exchange) value of an object. Use-value exists in an object quite apart from the object's use in the social relation commodity. This is not to say that use-value is itself a property of the object and not an embodiment of a social relation. Use-value, as Baudrillard painstakingly points out and Marx himself realized, is itself a social relation -- the social relation of demand and consumption. Insofar as *knowledge* is a social relation other than that social rel-

various levels, etc. In some way, our first inspection is knowledge in the sense of justified true belief, our second inspection is knowledge in the sense of physical and social artifacts which count as realizations of such belief. These senses, and these inspections, are related -- there is at least bivalent polysemy in the word 'knowledge'. It shall in fact be central to this paper to examine how knowledge in the rhetorical sense is grounded in *knowledge* in the institutional sense -- why we can justify/assert just those things which we can.

(2) Once truth is deprived of its pseudo-ontological status, there is really nothing for knowledge/science to be besides ideology -- especially in the fully general sense of ideology I give ("Ideology is simply a systematic set of beliefs which justify, explain, or lend coherence to ways of acting"). It may well be that certain institutional arrangement set apart part of ideology from the rest -- this part being knowledge/science -- but this is inessential. This is no shocker, really. Many others would say that knowledge is "true ideology" (i.e. ideology which is true, not "truly ideology"). I merely disallow the "true" part while allowing the ideology part. Let me excerpt briefly from my aforementioned paper.

I shall claim that any definition of knowledge must be sociological/anthropological. . . . Following my claim for a moment, we see that the alternative consequence to finding an anthropological definition of knowledge is to relegate our knowledge-talk to its emotive and rhetorical functions.

ation commodity, and the former may mediate and create consumption and demand -- insofar as the social relation *knowledge* may enter into the creation of use-value -- knowledge may be considered part of use-value; but it is deceptive to express this this way. *Knowledge* is a social relation which only incidentally creates use value, just as it is only incidental that *knowledge* and commodity may be embodied in the same object.

I still stand by this -- though I may have earlier failed to clearly distinguish the two inspections of knowledge given above.

Knowledge considered.

What is the nature of *knowledge*? What social relations go under this name? In the case of commodity, the relations in the circuit of capital are essential. Certain persons work in certain places doing certain tasks, and certain persons come in possession of objects created -- with the former and the latter largely disjoint. These relations are ultimately grounded in the State monopoly on violence (itself a social relation); violation of the legitimated circuit of capital is, in the extreme case, met with violence. *Knowledge* is those social relations which allow us to "get away with" just those assertion of fact which we do. If commodity can be said to boil down to possession, *knowledge* can be said to boil down to power. This is only the roughest sketch, but it points in the right direction.

I should point out (again) that the category 'knowledge' cannot be developed on an a

Laboratory Life

I shall discuss a particular instance of *knowledge*: science. At least since the logical positivists it has been this domain which has most frequently been given credit for producing knowledge. It is not merely because of any epistemological weight which positivism has mustered for the sciences that they are particularly worth examining. Sciences have been accepted by relatively wide segments of speakers (for various social reasons) as areas to which we should assign knowledges; for some speakers, as the only area. As anthropologists, our use of local words must at least have similar range of use as the natives' usage (the natives being ourselves). Hence it seems particularly poignant to examine knowledge-production in the

priori basis. I may not a priori define the social relation *knowledge* -- at the pain of my category having no application to the actual social relations of persons. It is an empirical matter what kinds of relations persons enter into, and our categories ought to reflect our observations of this contingent world. We may start our effort by a detour through some amateur lexicography. I hope to make a scientific rather than a commonsense category out of 'knowledge', but our commonsense ways of speaking are commonly good ones. The OED has the following to say about "knowledge."

1. Acknowledgement, confession. b. Acknowledgement or recognition of the position or claims (of any one). obs

2. The fact of recognizing as something known, or known about, before; recognition. To take knowledge of, to recognize. obs.

3. Legal cognizance; judicial investigation or inquiry. obs.

4. Cognizance, notice . . . obs.

5. The fact of knowing a thing, state, etc. or (in general sense) a person; acquaintance; familiarity gained by experience.

...8. Acquaintance with a fact; perception, or certain information of, a fact or matter; state of being aware or informed; consciousness (of

sciences. More mundane reasons present themselves: it is the "hard" sciences which have received the greater part of the attention of the social sciences of knowledge-production.

The specific guide I shall use is Latour and Woolgar's descriptions in Laboratory Life of a neuro-endocrinology lab. Latour and Woolgar describe the laboratory as divided into two main sections: "the office" and "the bench." The bench is (briefly) concerned with the production of document to be transferred to the office. Here I use "production" in its literal sense. The technicians (who work in the bench) use technological machinery as a means to put labor into the transformation of raw (or lower stage) materials into certain sorts of documents. Slightly more exactly, we may say that the raw materials are divided into those which are literally transformed (the paper and ink of the inscription device) and

anything).

b. Acquaintance with facts, range of information, ken. Esp. in phrases as to one's knowledge, so far as one is aware; also as one is aware, as one can testify . . .

9. Intellectual acquaintance with, or perception of, fact or truth; clear and certain mental apprehension; the fact, state, or condition of understanding. [a - e]

10. Acquaintance with a branch of learning, a language, or the like; theoretical or practical understanding of an art, science, industry, etc.

11. In general sense: The fact or condition of being instructed, or of having information acquired by study or research; acquaintance with ascertained truths, facts, or principles; information acquired by study; learning; erudition.

12. Information; intelligence; notice, intimation. obs.

13. The sum of what is known.

14. A branch of learning; a science; an art.

15. A sign or mark by which anything is known, recognized, or distinguished; a token.

...

I shall wish to distinguish that which is essential to the social relation *knowledge from* what is accidental. This is not to disparage the accidental features of the social relation; every social relation is

those which act as tools for the production of the inscriptions (i.e. the tissue samples).

The activity of the office is taking the inscriptions produced in the bench and combining them with other documents imported into the lab, according to certain skilled operations. The two sorts of documents brought into the office do not act as materials which are themselves transformed, but are rather guidelines for producing yet more documents (if you like, the unprocessed documents act as sorts of partial molds for the finished ones.

The above picture sketched by Latour and Woolgar seems to be consistent with the activity of other scientific labs, and to a lesser degree with the activities of researchers in humanities fields; though I stand in need of empirical corroboration in this regard. All laboratories have productive divisions of labor of the

concretely instantiated in accidental ways, and often in the ways it is for good and useful reasons. What I shall consider essential to *knowledge* is the possibility for legitimation or justification. This is not only for the sentences which may (in writing or speech) embody *knowledge*, but also for the artifacts which may do so. A particular apparatus' use in a laboratory rests on the possibility of justifying and legitimating its use. In particular, the justification is in terms of physical principles, previous texts "about" these physical principles, and shared mythologies of those who use the apparatus. A given object (including a mark on paper or a puff of air) may embody the relation *knowledge* insofar as it may be justified or legitimated, or may generally play a role in the "games" of justification or legitimation. This is essential to the social relation.

What is accidental (though infinitely important) to the relation *knowledge* are the possibilities for legitimation conferred by education, the distributions of possibilities for legitimation (areas of expertise or

general sort just described. However, the knowledge produced by a laboratory is said to exist in the articles which are eventually produced and sent off. We shall have to look at the broader relations that the final documents (articles) have to the social space in which the whole of the laboratory is embedded.

In order to explain this broader social space I shall bring in an additional notion. It concerns the transformation of assertion types. Latour and Woolgar divide the assertions present in the articles which are produced in the laboratory into five types. The assertion types identified by Latour and Woolgar range from presupposed statements (type 5), through speculations (type 1). The range in the middle is characterized by varying modalities.

All of these assertion types appear both within articles and in the verbal exchanges of scientists (or at least

competence which different persons have), the manner in which the possibilities for legitimation reflect class struggle, etc.

Let us turn to the recommendations of the OED in this light. Parts 1, 3 and 8b where it uses the perfect phrase, 'one can testify', bring to light what I consider essential about the relation *knowledge*. The phrase in 8b is really perfect -- though I do not put too much weight in the fact it happened to occur in the OED, clearly I was looking for this -- especially if we are sensitive to the modality involved in 'can'. It is not merely that we are willing to testify that constitutes the relation *knowledge*, it is that we can do so -- i.e. that we are able to, that we are in a position to perform the act of testimony, that we are allowed to testify, etc. In a legal court where testimony takes place the sense of "getting away with" assertions is prominent. In court we may actually face direct and corporal punishment if our assertions do not fit the explicitly defined institutional guidelines. Do not think of someone actually on trial, who may as we say lie and "get away with" it by being found not

our particular group of neuro-endocrinologists). It can also be established that some of these assertions are transformed through repetition from type 1 to type 4, and type 5. The factual basis of this can be found in citations within the journals common to the group of scientists in question. The more cited is a fact, the more it tends toward type 4 and type 5.

The definition I give for knowledge, at least in the case of these neuro-endocrinologists, is "the assertions which move from type 1 to type 5 status." The behavior of the scientists, in fact, seems to follow a rational regularity such that all assertions originate as type 1 assertions. I would like to go further to suggest that another stage is available which even more clearly suggests the knowledge status of an assertion. This stage is the reification of an assertion into a material tool. The justification of the

guilty. Think of the circumstance of every witness, whose testimony is judged by standards of form and manner rather than content. One's danger of being held in contempt of the court comes generally not in that one may say something "untrue," but in that one may fail to testify in the prescribed manner, form or style.

Parts 10, 11, 12 point to what I would consider accidental features of the relation. That it is education, skill, acquaintance, etc. which are necessary for legitimation is contingent, though important. Also, as part 11 and several other parts point out, knowledge is associated with truths or facts. Anything which counts as an embodiment of *knowledge* is true/a fact, or represents or embodies a truth/a fact. These are equivalent ways of speaking: in terms of knowledge or in terms of facts/truths. Part 14 points out the specifically institutional realization of the social relation.

Having taken this detour, let us return to our attempt to characterize the phenomenon which underlies our talk about knowledge.

use of a certain instrument by scientists is that the instrument represents the principles of past knowledge. I suggest that we would find that this "past knowledge" has already travelled the course from type 1 to type 5 assertion, before the instrument was designed or built. This reification, which only happens to some type 5 assertions, is probably the final stage through which a scientific knowledge can pass.

I shall sketch Latour and Woolgar's theory of "credit." Latour and Woolgar distinguish the two senses of "credit," recognition/ reward versus credibility, by analogy with the distinction between consumption capital and investment capital. Their scientists, like the capitalist to whom they are compared, are interested in credit for the sake of renewing credit itself, not for the sake of personal benefits. Credit as credibility is gained by producing knowledges, in just the sense in which I have been

I wrote above that *knowledge* is power, or actually that *knowledge* "boils down to power." Each of these assertions is true in a slightly different way. When we consider *knowledge* as an institution rather than as a rhetoric (as distinguished in the section "Ideology and Science/Knowledge") we may further distinguish two foci. On the one hand we say "Smith knows X inasmuch as she is empowered to assert X, can justify/-legitimate asserting X." On the other hand we speak of the whole institution which does this empowerment, or grants this justification/ legitimation. In the first case we are not merely speaking of the rhetorical act Smith performs, but of its very possibility -- which presupposes the institution which creates this possibility.

This may seem opaque under this manner of expression, but it is really quite commonsense. We know that different persons have different "areas of expertise," i.e. different ranges of allowable "knowledge talk." A leading particle physicist can "get away with" making certain assertions about the behavior of newly discovered particles,

speaking. A scientist who has produced an assertion which runs the path from type 1 to type 5 is granted certain measures of credit. Interestingly, this credit is of both types: said scientist is both given praise and awards which would seem to fall into the category of recognition, and is given new means to produce knowledges, such as grants, appointments, etc. However, even here this distinction falls apart. Those forms of credit which would prima facie seem to be forms of recognition become entries in the scientist's *curriculum vitae*, which is a sort of note of credibility. As is the case for capital, credit has no internal division, but only different uses.

Latour and Woolgar describe the events leading to the construction of the fact that "TRF is Pyro-Glu-His-Pro-NH₂." Certainly no one could have said what this fact would be before it was constructed, but enough constraints had been successfully

while I cannot. This physicist will be published making these assertions, will be listened to by other physicists, will be invited to address lectures to the topic of these particles, etc. -- I will not.

Clearly, there are institutional (not epistemic) differences which determine the different assertions a leading physicist and myself can "get away with" -- differences in academic position, different CV's, different educational backgrounds, we are paid by different employers and keep different company, we probably dress differently and talk differently (for example, in lexicon), and so on. It is also clear that it is the institutional differences, and not any "epistemic" differences, which determine what each of us can "get away with" -- when the leading physicist is invited to lecture on particle physics and I am not it is not because the host of the lecture is in any position to weigh the "epistemic" merits of what either of us would say (and perhaps we would say the same thing at that), it is because the host is in a position to weigh the institutional differences between she and I.

instituted as to the construction of a fact within this scientific program to bring this field down to economics. In particular, certain knowledge had already been successfully produced as to what laboratory techniques would satisfy the social constraints of the production of this type of knowledge. Latour and Woolgar quote anonymously:

"...[B]ecause I knew what we were competing against in this country [USA] in terms of money, scale of work . . . and there were no ways we could achieve parity, if you like, in England at the time."

We see that in this concrete case, wealth becomes the necessary requisite to the production of knowledge, and hence for the gain of credit. This suggests that even that requisite knowledge-production, namely credibility, which seemed at first to be purely ideological, is tied to economics. But let us turn to those situations of knowledge which seem to be strictly ideological.

Think here of the sense of "getting away with" testimony above. A lecture host act similarly to a judge: she does not weigh (at least beforehand, in either case) the difference in the accuracy of what is said, but only differences of the conditions in which it is said -- for the latter principally the actual manner, for the former principally the background of the speaker.

The above is not to claim that the institutional differences do not reflect epistemic differences; but it is to claim that even if they did not a lecture host, for example, would act in quite the same manner. What would be necessary for institutional differences to reflect epistemic differences? Clearly more is needed than the claimed epistemic purposes of the institution. Papal infallibility, for example, seems to be an unjustified institutional epistemic claim. What would be necessary is to show that a person institutionalized into a certain role was in the process conditioned with various accurate, or at least supported, beliefs which are not in general circulation. So the lecture host, from the above example, in

If we accept the model of scientific knowledge as a class of assertions which move from type 1 to type 5, then Latour and Woolgar write directly about the ideological allocation of knowledges. The cycle of credibility described above is certainly part of the ideology of knowledge. That is: only speakers with a certain measure of credibility can make assertions which become knowledges. Some similar structure may exist in other domains, though many differences certainly exist (science and prophecy require different credentials). Let me examine the structure of ideology in the production of one particular fact.

In the creation of the fact about the structure of TRF (mentioned above), two major groups were competing for precedence in the creation of a knowledge: these are the laboratories of Guillemin and Schally. A consistent pattern of citation occurred in the articles of these two groups: the

order to make invitations on a genuinely epistemic basis would have to be appraised of not only the institutionalization of physicists and their differences from the general populace, but also of the actual grounds for the physics which the physicist learned. Few lecture hosts are appraised of all this.

To be clearer on what it means to say *knowledge is power* let us consider another case which doesn't seem so terribly epistemic. If I am being arrested by a police officer the most immediate fact which gives her the power to carry this out, is I suppose -- and not, for example, for the reverse to occur -- that she has a gun and I do not. It is clear enough that a great part of power in our societies comes down to the state monopoly on violence. However, suppose that I also have a gun; where does the asymmetry now come from? She may, for example, radio for more police officers to come for assistance -- and think here of the actual assertion which is involved in doing this: she must assert at least "I am a police officer" to the dispatcher in order to get

Schally group cited their own articles and the articles of the Guillemin group equally frequently, while the Guillemin group cited their own articles with much greater frequency than those of the Schally group. Furthermore, the Schally group's citations of the Guillemin group's articles generally followed a pattern of elaboration upon the original assertions. The Guillemin group, to the contrary, cited the Schally group primarily in the form of criticizing the assertions of the latter. Initially one might claim that this difference is due to the epistemological status of each group's assertions. However, this is contradicted by an examination of the actual series of articles.

In 1966 the Schally group produced a series of assertions which were essentially the same as the eventually constituted fact. However, the Guillemin group made criticisms of these claims, largely on the basis of the amount of credibility which was

reinforcements. If I were to attempt a similar radio call for assistance I would not (probably) "get away with" the assertion. This is clearly not because of an epistemic difference between a police officer and myself -- it is not because she has a "justified true belief" that she is, in fact, a police officer while I lack such a belief -- it is solely due to an institutional difference between us. She is institutionally empowered to make an assertion which I am not empowered to make.

But let us again turn to the assertion *knowledge is power*. We have said that *knowledge* is a social relation, and specifically the social relation involved in "getting away with" assertions. It is hard to think of any case where the power we have, even the power of physical violence, is not mediated by the kinds of assertions we can make. As I have pointed to, even the state monopoly on violence is principally regulated by the structure of justifiable/legitimatable assertion -- and this is even clearer when we consider that part of this monopoly involving courts and legislatures with their

appropriate to grant to the Schally group. As a result of this, the Schally group abandoned its own program, until three years later when the Guillemin group started making assertions which were essentially identical with the ones made by the Schally group earlier. Shortly after this, these assertions were corroborated, and now have knowledge status.

The point of this discussion is not to case doubt on the epistemological honesty of these scientists, as we think that this sort of situation is one often repeated in the sciences, and elsewhere; and of necessity, not due to systematic epistemological dishonesty. What we should notice is that the two rounds of assertion of essentially the same "fact" had different origins within the ideological space, and that this is the only possible way to account for why one and not the other create a knowledge. The explanation for the

structures of testimony, expertise, precedent, etc all of which are clear matters of who may assert what and "get away with" it.

Institutional prescriptions exist which allow certain persons to make certain kinds of assertions. More than this, however, almost any time we act by any social convention we must be able to make associate assertions. Under a Wittgensteinian formulation: all, or almost all, of the social games we play involve the language game of assertion.

asymmetric polymorphism of the ideological realm seems to be the scientists' commitment to a symbolic ontology of "credit." Candidacy for knowledge is strictly an ideological creation, even if epistemological criteria choose among a narrow class of claims.