Fwd: [election] VIDEO: SANTA BARBARA Computer Security Group Shows How to Hack Voting Machines and Defeat Post-Election Audits

From: Edward Cherlin <echerlin_at_gmail_dot_com>
Date: Wed Sep 10 2008 - 15:23:21 CDT

I assume that these methods of fraud do not apply to our printed
ballots, since we have various extra audit capabilities that do not
apply to DREs with "voter-verifiable printed records". But we should
say so publicly, and explain.

---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: Kathy Dopp <kathy.dopp@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, Sep 10, 2008 at 12:01 PM
Subject: [election] VIDEO: SANTA BARBARA Computer Security Group Shows
How to Hack Voting Machines and Defeat Post-Election Audits
To: election@uscountvotes.org

I apologize for mistyping the title of the university as "Berkeley" in
my prior email title. The correct university is "Santa Barbara".

VIDEO: Santa Barbara Computer Security Group Shows How to Hack Voting
Machines and Defeat Post-Election Audits

Evaluating the Security of Electronic Voting Systems - Are your votes
really counted?
http://www.cs.ucsb.edu/~seclab/projects/voting/

The films produced by The Computer Security Group at the University of
California at Santa Barbara show how easily U.S. voting machines can
be used to fraudulently manipulate votes *in a way that no election
official would notice or be able to detect - even with valid
post-election audits*.

The UC Santa Barbara students shows how the paper roll ballot records
can be also easily be fraudulently manipulated to match the fraudulent
electronic tallies and thus the fraudulent election results are *not*
detectable by any post-election manual audit.

The Santa Barbara students have discovered and showed how to
implement two all-new methods of fraudulently manipulating touchscreen
e-ballot votes in ways that no valid post-election audit can detect by
the method of "Fake Fleeing Voter" and "After the Fact Vote".

These Santa Barbara Security Group videos are well-worth watching for
anyone that believes that touchscreen e-ballot voting machines are OK
as long as they have a voter-verifiable paper ballot record.

While the computer voting machine used to demonstrate these concepts
is manufactured by Sequoia, the same four methods of fraudulently
manipulating vote counts in ways that no manual post-election audit
could detect and no election official would notice, can be
accomplished on *any* touchscreen e-ballot (DRE) voting machine.

Carefully watch this video to understand fully why e-ballot
touchscreen voting is not secure, not auditable for vote fraud, and
not trustworthy.

Evaluating the Security of Electronic Voting Systems - Are your votes
really counted?
http://www.cs.ucsb.edu/~seclab/projects/voting/

A cost-effective Solution to give confidence that election outcomes
are determined by voters is Optical scan systems that use voter-marked
paper ballots, public oversight over all aspects of elections
including ballot security and ballot reconciliation, and independent,
scientific post-election auditing.

--
Correction: In my last email I said that voter fraud, ineligible
persons voting, is "not a problem". I more precisely meant that voter
fraud is an "insignificant" problem because the bi-partisan research
shows that voter fraud occurs in negligible amounts that would not
alter any election outcome in any state.
Kathy Dopp
The material expressed herein is the informed product of the author
Kathy Dopp's fact-finding and investigative efforts. Dopp is a
Mathematician, Expert in election audit mathematics and procedures; in
exit poll discrepancy analysis; and can be reached at
P.O. Box 680192
Park City, UT 84068
phone 435-658-4657
http://utahcountvotes.org
http://electionmathematics.org
http://electionarchive.org
How to Audit Election Outcome Accuracy
http://electionarchive.org/ucvAnalysis/US/paper-audits/VoteCountAuditBillRequest.pdf
History of Confidence Election Auditing Development & Overview of
Election Auditing Fundamentals
http://electionarchive.org/ucvAnalysis/US/paper-audits/History-of-Election-Auditing-Development.pdf
Voters Have Reason to Worry
http://utahcountvotes.org/UT/UtahCountVotes-ThadHall-Response.pdf
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Received on Tue Sep 30 23:17:02 2008

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