Why secure election systems?

From: charlie strauss <cems_at_earthlink_dot_net>
Date: Wed Sep 13 2006 - 13:00:11 CDT

Just posting a feel-good post here. Whenever the election integrity community points out this or that vulnerability the response of election officials is almost invariable to downplay the threat by saying they control their machines well so that vulnerability can't be exploited by evil-doers in the public at large, and they trust their own people and procedures.

I think the following points out why systems transparency is so neccessary.

Now, here is an excerpt from Rep. Holt's speech:

The Department of Justice (DOJ), in its “Report to Congress on the
Activities and Operations of the Public Integrity for 2004,” reported
that “[a]t the end of 2004, the [Public Integrity] Section was
supervising and providing advice on approximately 133 election crime
matters nationwide.” That is an average of just over 2 cases per State
for the entire year – hardly an avalanche. In addition, most of the
cases described with specificity in the report concerned campaign
finance violations. Only one described a vote-buying scheme, and none
referred specifically to non-citizen or double voting. On the other
hand, the same Report noted that a total of 1,213 public officials had
been federally charged with corruption in 2004, that 1,020 of them had
been convicted of corruption, and that 419 cases remained pending. In
other words, according to the DOJ’s own findings, the problem of
corruption among public officials is at the very least ten times worse
than the problem of citizens cheating in elections.

Read the rest here:

http://www.votetrustusa.org/index.php

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Received on Sat Sep 30 23:17:04 2006

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