Re: Denying the Troops a Secret Ballot

From: charlie strauss <cems_at_earthlink_dot_net>
Date: Sat Sep 04 2004 - 04:44:51 CDT

It seems to me that if there ever was a good case for
VoteHere technology this would be it. My sense is that the risk to troops is not so much corruption of their vote but rather knwoing their vote was cast, counted and delivered secretly. One still has the problem of assuring that the voting kiosk is secure but this may be the lesser of the risks compared to the issue of prompt transmission and verifiable delivery. One could image perhaps a knopix type live CD that the computer booted from and performed the tasks of vote collation, encryption, and then vote delivery validation using VoteHere's call-in vote validation. The remaining problems are 1) assuring the voter voted once and this could perhaps be accomplished by tagging the vote with a unique but random ID given to the soldier or if the number of kiosks is finite then with simply limiting access. and 2) assuring that non-voting soldiers votes are simply not stuffed. VoteHere would solve this latter case if a non-voting soldier were to call in and find he was recorded as having actually cast a vote.
 

This does not solve a re-count issue or kiosk corruption issue but these are likely the lesser of two evils to the transmission of votes from rugged field conditions where ones vote might not even be counted and chain of custody issues of paper ballots might be problematic.

just a thought.
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Received on Thu Sep 30 23:17:02 2004

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