Re: Daily Kos vote

From: Ronald Crane <voting_at_lastland_dot_net>
Date: Wed Oct 21 2009 - 12:23:06 CDT
Briefly, there is no perfect solution; there are only compromises. Probably the best approach for limiting hand-filled paper box stuffing is continuous public supervision of the ballot boxes. This must begin with public verification that the boxes are empty, continue throughout the voting, and then until all the polling place's ballots have been counted (at the polling place!) and the results posted there, phoned in to the media, and posted on the net. This still leaves open the possibility of stuffing afterward, but before any recount. Ideally we should have some means of reducing that threat. Still, because it's mostly a locality-by-locality threat, it's much less likely to flip state/national elections than an insider hacking a widely-used electronic system's software/firmware/hardware.

-R

Edward Cherlin wrote:
Hi, Ron. How do you deal with ballot-box stuffing and other known
hazards of paper-only?

On Wed, Oct 21, 2009 at 09:50, Ronald Crane <voting@lastland.net> wrote:
  
Edward Cherlin wrote:
    
Hi, Bev. I'm not clear why we are still having this argument. Part of
the OVC design is public counting, as we demonstrated last year at
Linux World Expo. Haven't you seen the video?

      
And once again, the ballot-printer design is still vulnerable to delay- and
denial-of-service attacks, presentation attacks, and selection attacks, all
of which are far more difficult to wage against hand-filled paper. Ballot
printers are also vulnerable to out-and-out misrecording attacks, since, as
Selker has shown, "voter verification" is quite poor at detecting errors.

-R

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Received on Sat Oct 31 23:17:04 2009

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