Re: Daily Kos vote

From: Ronald Crane <voting_at_lastland_dot_net>
Date: Wed Oct 21 2009 - 11:50:18 CDT

Edward Cherlin wrote:
> Hi, Bev. I'm not clear why we are still having this argument. Part of
> the OVC design is public counting, as we demonstrated last year at
> Linux World Expo. Haven't you seen the video?
And once again, the ballot-printer design is still vulnerable to delay-
and denial-of-service attacks, presentation attacks, and selection
attacks, all of which are far more difficult to wage against hand-filled
paper. Ballot printers are also vulnerable to out-and-out misrecording
attacks, since, as Selker has shown, "voter verification" is quite poor
at detecting errors.


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Received on Sat Oct 31 23:17:04 2009

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