Re: Pull the Plug on E-Voting

From: Charlie Strauss <cems_at_earthlink_dot_net>
Date: Fri Oct 27 2006 - 10:35:44 CDT

On Oct 26, 2006, at 2:10 PM, Ron Crane wrote:

> Richard C. Johnson wrote:
>> Mr. O'Dell's ...
>> also ignors the audit provisions built into, for example, the Open
>> Source voting systems at Open Voting Solutions (see
>> I too have a background in
>> financial software and I know what an audit is. I can assure you
>> that cross-checking between dual paper and electronic ballots is
>> absolutely and provably more secure than paper ballots alone.
> Please prove this in light of the fact that ballot printers inject
> a (potentially malicious) computational intermediary between voters
> and their ballots, while hand-filled paper systems do not. "Voter
> verification" is no substitute for hand-filled ballots, especially
> in light of Ted Selker's study (see the Brennan Center's report, p.
> 66) showing that voters in a simulated election identified fewer
> than 3% of simulated errors on VVPATs.

Selker was testing paper tapes which he showed were a cognitively
inaccessible format. The OVC paper summary ballot looks and feels a
lot like a hand marked paper ballot, and it's in the voters hands.
Secondly, simulated preferences are not the participants real
preferences and one can expect lower acuity to errors (he should have
made it a gambling game with money riding on it to promote actual
interest in the outcome by the "simulated" voter)

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Received on Tue Oct 31 23:17:08 2006

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