Re: Security markings on the ballot

From: David Mertz <voting-project_at_gnosis_dot_cx>
Date: Sun Oct 26 2003 - 22:36:33 CST

"Douglas W. Jones" <jones@cs.uiowa.edu> wrote:
|You're forgetting the fixed landmarks on the page -- election time and
|date, county name, barcode and all that. Those landmarks stay put, so
|it is the relationship of the movable elements to that material that
|will be the most obvious.

True enough. I'm convinced that two images with variable placement will
provide a good amount of entropy, and will be reliably verifiable.

I guess still open is whether this placement is determined uniquely for
every cast ballot--as I believe the hash code should be--or if the
placements are only decided per machine or per polling place. But there
is no need to decide that level of detail for the demo; that can wait
for the grant(s) we'll hopefully come up with, and for associated formal
threat analysis.

Yours, David...

--
Keeping medicines from the bloodstreams of the sick; food from the bellies
of the hungry; books from the hands of the uneducated; technology from the
underdeveloped; and putting advocates of freedom in prisons.  Intellectual
property is to the 21st century what the slave trade was to the 16th.
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Received on Fri Oct 31 23:17:05 2003

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