Re: Focus on Rights

From: Bev Harris <bev_at_blackboxvoting_dot_org>
Date: Tue Nov 13 2007 - 01:37:40 CST

> mandatory
> random manual statistically significant audits are key, not only to
> significantly reducing the risk of fraud but also for catching bugs in
> the technology. The audit could be televised live, videotaped, etc. If
> we had the right kind of audits, I don't think we'd need to scan in all
> the ballots and post them on the internet.

What is your proposed defense for ballot substitution by insiders? We already
can document multiple locations with chain of custody breaches. Nothing in
proposed legislation, nothing even contemplated by the Holt folks even begins
to address the simple ballot substitution end-run for spot checks (they are NOT
"audits", you are talking about spot checks).

Volusia County: same person we caught at the warehouse with counterfeit poll
tapes had a key and 24-hour unsupervised access to the ballot vault. San Mateo
County: 7 weeks missing in the ballot vault access logs. Ballot substitution
for the tiny spot check segments is a piece of cake, especially when counties
have the do-it-yourself ballot manufacturing technology enabled by Ballot Now,
Ballot on Demand, and the packing slips/ballot masters provided by printers
like Fidlar.


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Received on Fri Nov 30 23:17:22 2007

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