Re: OVC-discuss Digest, Vol 37, Issue 10

From: Arthur Keller <voting_at_kellers_dot_org>
Date: Mon Nov 05 2007 - 09:35:35 CST

While the shortage of voting machines in parts of Ohio certainly
denied the right to vote, using electronics does not imply denial of
the right to vote. Policies and procedures need to be put in place
that allow voting during an electrical failure or when there is a
shortage of supplies.

In the November 2006 election in California, voters were allowed to
vote on paper. In Santa Clara County, voting on paper was done on
the sample ballot in the ballot booklet. When the paper trails were
running out on all but one voting machine in my precinct in the 2006
election, I gave $40 in cash, my car keys, and a sample ballot to
make copies. Over a dozen voters cast their votes on Kinko's-printed
ballots. No voters were delayed in my precinct, despite a large
number of voters showing up at my polling place.

Best regards,

At 11:02 AM -0500 11/5/07, Nancy Tobi wrote:
>Here's a concept:
>the opportunity to verify does not equate with the right to vote
>the paradigm shift from right to vote to opportunity to verify is
>actually a subversion of our democracy and should be repelled at all
>~nancy tobi
>On 11/5/07, Ronald Crane
><<>> wrote:
>Ronald Crane wrote:
>>Further, as I mentioned earlier, "voter verification" does not in
>>any way impede (a) delay- or denial-of-service attacks; (b) attacks
>>that move candidates about the ballot or drop them from it; (c)
>>attacks that change the presentation of the ballot so as to
>>emphasize or de-emphasize particular objects (remember what
>>happened in Sarasota when some official omitted a header?); or (d)
>>attacks that make it easier (or more difficult) to select a
>>candidate. All of these attacks influence the voter's actual
>>choices, so they do not create the inconsistency between the
>>voter's ballot and her recollection that "voter verification" aims
>>to detect.
>The last sentence should read, "All of these attacks influence the
>voter's actual choices (or prevent her from voting), so they do not
>create the inconsistency between the voter's ballot and her
>recollection that "voter verification" aims to detect."

Arthur M. Keller, Ph.D., 3881 Corina Way, Palo Alto, CA  94303-4507
tel +1(650)424-0202, fax +1(650)424-0424

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Received on Fri Nov 30 23:17:11 2007

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