I thought the OVC approach is to require voter marked paper ballots,
not voter verified. For voters with disabilities that impair their
ability to mark a ballot, ballot printers operated by the voters
provide the needed enhanced accessibility.
One of the things that has motivated me in this is observing the
Logic an Accuracy testing in San Mateo County, CA. Testers were paid
to vote according to scripted choices. On the first day, few of the
actually verified the paper trail and the vote counts were way off
from the expected results.
On subsequent days of testing, the paid testers did better.
I found this dramatic proof that use of machines with the little
paper tape is vastly inferior to voter-marked paper ballots.
On Nov 1, 2007, at 2:15 PM, Hamilton Richards wrote:
> We agree that mismanaged e-voting invites wholesale fraud, whereas in
> paper-only voting the fraud is limited to retail. The outrage of the
> folks who insist on paper-only voting in reaction to the massively
> mismanaged first generation of e-voting systems is understandable,
> but it has apparently blinded them to the security advantages of
> e-voting voter-verified-paper-ballot systems such as the one
> prototyped by the OVC
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Received on Fri Nov 30 23:17:04 2007
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