Re: TAR--audits. urgently need help to get law.

From: Kathy Dopp <kathy_dot_dopp_at_gmail_dot_com>
Date: Tue Nov 21 2006 - 21:43:42 CST

On 11/21/06,

> Date: Tue, 21 Nov 2006 16:49:43 -0500 (EST)
> From: charlie strauss <>
> Subject: Re: [OVC-discuss] TAR--audits. urgently need help to get law.
> We also liked the idea of counting whole machines rather than say sampling 10% of the ballots in every machine. Our feeling was that most error modalities and most suspciious events are machine or precint specific. By recounting a machine in it's entrirety you get defintive and actionable information about the machine's electronic total accuracy.


I agree with most of what you say here. Your approach of counting all
the races on sufficient machine counts to detect outcome-altering
miscount in the closest race is interesting, and may result in routine
100% hand counts. I agree with you that ballot sampling is very
impractical and not as informative as audits that count 100% of all
ballots associated with particular machine COUNTS.

You should change your language though to audit "machine COUNTS", not
"machines". As you are aware, auditing "machines" could be easily
misinterpreted as post-election day machine testing which would never
detect deliberate vote fraud.

Is NM using Precinct-based op-scan (PCOS) machines or Central count CCOS?

If PCOS, then you are aware that you are really selecting polling
locations COUNTS, rather than precinct COUNTS, if you specify the
machine rather than the machine COUNTS to audit. If you are selecting
polling location counts to audit, then you should adjust for variation
in the total number of ballots cast in each polling location as it
explains and shows how to do in our paper here:


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Received on Thu Nov 30 23:17:10 2006

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