Re: voter-induced compromise of the paper trail

From: Fred McLain <mclain_at_zipcon_dot_net>
Date: Fri Nov 12 2004 - 19:18:35 CST

I really like what Allan said here:

"The act of voting is putting the paper ballot in the ballot box.".

That is a major difference between an under glass recording system and a
system where you have a paper ballot. This summer I met with a CEO of a
local voting technologies company. He described this rather well. To
paraphrase, "my grandmother asked me her vote would count if she didn't
look at the print out. I said no. She then asked why should I?". The
simple act of having the voter carry their ballot to the ballot box is a
great incentive to have them verify the paper trail.

        -Fred-

On Fri, 2004-11-12 at 12:10, Alan Dechert wrote:
> Extensively.
>
> With the OVC system, the act of voting is putting the paper ballot in the
> ballot box. If you walk away with your ballot, it's the same as if you walk
> away with your opt scan ballot without submitting it -- you didn't vote!
>
> There will always be more electronic ballot images than paper ballots (due
> to tests, re-dos, etc). The cast ballots get reconciled against the
> electronic record.
>
> http://www.openvotingconsortium.org/ad/brp-guide.pdf
>
> Alan D
>
>
> > It's been established that a "ballot-under-glass" scheme is untenable due
> to the specialized equipment involved. But what is to stop a voter from
> leaving the polling place with his paper ballot, either by neglect or as
> part of a payoff scheme? This compromises the vote both by enabling such
> schemes and by affecting hand-recount totals.
> >
> > I can't see a way around this without specialized equipment, either
> "ballot-under-glass" or an electronic/motorized ballot-box device that can
> accept and confirm proper ballot deposit before recording the vote.
> >
> > Has this been addressed before?
> >
> > BL
> >
> >
> >
> > ----- Original Message -----
> > From: "Keith Copenhagen" <k@copetech.com>
> > To: "ovc" <voting-project@lists.sonic.net>
> > Subject: Polling Station BRP
> > Date: Fri, 12 Nov 2004 14:18:40 -0500
> >
> > >
> > > Balancing privacy at moment of casting vs. the risk of loss.
> > >
> > > As uncounted ballots collect in the ballot box, the anonymity increases
> > > and the magnitude of possible vote loss also increases. This is true for
> > > both physical and virtual ballots. I understand that the physical
> > > insecurity of the ballot box is a key issue pushing eVoting.
> >
> >
>
>
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Received on Tue Nov 30 23:17:31 2004

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