Re: voter-induced compromise of the paper trail

From: <dr-jekyll_at_att_dot_net>
Date: Fri Nov 12 2004 - 17:39:13 CST

In 1986, when I first publicly advocated VVPB, the method I presented was to cut the ballots for anonymity, but only after they were approved. The alternative action was to print a spoiled ballot message as the identifier between the spoiled ballots and the approved ones. The physical attachment of spoiled ballots to approved ballots was deliberate to 1) Prevent stuffing the ballot box and 2) To allow the recount people to detect trends in altering after the voter verification review. A large number of identical voter changes might indicate tampering.

There are numerous similar ways that have been developed since then. I have developed a data model that enables recording of the basics of these voter changes on disk, so the total voter changes can be printed along with the election results.

--
Kurt 
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-------------- Original message from charlie strauss <cems@earthlink.net>: -------------- 
> Alan I was just reading this pdf over and an evil hack occurred to me. 
> 
> If a ballot is spoiled presumably it goes into a special spolied ballot 
> retention box and is logged in the system as spoiled. 
> If some evil election judge were to push the spoiled ballots into the real 
> ballot box the entry in the log would flag it during the reconcilation process. 
> 
> But what happens if an evil election judge is slightly more clever than this. 
> Suppose they simply mark my ballot as spoiled in the log after I put it in the 
> ballot box and leave the polling station? If that were the only spoiled ballot 
> that the reconcillation flagged there might be suspcisions aroused but no 
> evidence it was not a spoiled ballot that mistakenly landed in the ballot box. 
> To cover his tracks even better the evil eleciton judge could "accidentally" 
> shove a large set of spoiled test ballots into the box as well to make them all 
> appear to be test ballots. (note that the ovc ballot shuffling stage would 
> eliminate any tell-tale non-consecutivity of the ballots deliberately spoiled by 
> the evil election judge.) 
> 
> Is the key to preventing this, that the election judge would have no way of 
> knowing what the ID number of my ballot is and thus no way to selectively spoil 
> my ballot? 
> 
> If not then It seems like there ought to be a physical mark or spindling that 
> happens to spoiled ballots to make them distinguishable. 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> -----Original Message----- 
> From: Alan Dechert 
> Sent: Nov 12, 2004 2:10 PM 
> To: voting-project@lists.sonic.net 
> Subject: Re:  voter-induced compromise of the paper trail 
> 
> The Ballot Reconcillliation Procedure (or System) was one of four 
> applications that were part of our demo. 
> 
> http://www.openvotingconsortium.org/ad/brp-guide.pdf 
> 
> 
> 
> > >>Please read the OVC systems section on Ballot reconcilliation to 
> > >>understand how OVC works. 
> > 
> > Where is this ? 
> > 
> 
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Received on Tue Nov 30 23:17:30 2004

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