Re: PRESS RELEASE DRAFT

From: Alan Dechert <alan_at_openvotingconsortium_dot_org>
Date: Fri Nov 12 2004 - 13:59:35 CST

You're right. Can you suggest wording and place it? (the OVC url will be
prominent in the header)

Alan D.

> This calls attention to the problem, but shouldn't it mention the OVC's
proposed solution? Plug the website at least?
>
> BL
>
>
>
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: "Alan Dechert" <alan@openvotingconsortium.org>
> To: <voting-project@lists.sonic.net>
> Subject: PRESS RELEASE DRAFT
> Date: Fri, 12 Nov 2004 11:28:37 -0800
>
> >
> > This is pretty rough right now. Please give me your input now... I want
to
> > finish this today.
> >
> > Alan D.
> >
> >
> > PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION DISASTER AVERTED BY PURE LUCK
> >
> > Four years after America learned its voting system was broken, we still
do
> > not have a system that can reliably determine the winner in an extremely
> > close contest. This time, a larger margin masked the flaws.
> >
> > "We don't know how many votes were lost due to mismanagement or fraud,
but
> > it appears that George Bush got enough votes to overcome the slop in the
> > voting system," says Alan Dechert, President of the Open Voting
Consortium.
> > In one case alone, some 4,500 votes were lost from a single electronic
> > voting machine in North Carolina. "Paperless voting is a disaster
waiting
> > to happen. If that had happened in a swing state anywhere near as close
as
> > Florida in 2000, we'd be right back in the Supreme Court to find out who
> > won. We must not count on being so lucky in the future, praying for
> > elections that aren't so close. We must have a voting system where
every
> > vote is counted and where the count can be clearly verified."
> >
> > Long lines, registration problems, and a multitude of other problems
meant
> > that countless voters were disenfranchised. Decision makers at all
levels
> > simply failed to correct voting system faults these past four years.
> > "Democracy cannot afford to see them botch the job again," says Dechert.
> > "There is a growing consensus that electronic voting will work if we
take
> > proper security measures including a voter verified paper record of the
> > vote, and software that is open to scrutiny. Besides the pollsite
voting
> > machines, there are many other faults in the voting system that need
> > immediate attention. We need to begin now on a comprehensive effort to
> > de-privatize, open up, and clean up the voting system so that we are not
in
> > a similar situation next time."
> >
> > Typically, election officials are unqualified to evaluate new voting
> > technology. In a 60 Minutes program last month, Conny McCormack,
Registrar
> > of Voters for Los Angeles County, said "Voters love them," in reference
to
> > paperless touchscreen voting machines. Voters may or may not love
them --
> > surveys show that some voters love them while others are rightfully
> > distrustful. In any case, the machines need closer scrutiny. "Would
they
> > ask questions about the safety of a medical procedure of patients or of
> > doctors?" asked Professor Avi Rubin of Johns Hopkins in a recent
> > Computerworld interview. "They should ask computer security experts
about
> > computer security questions, not end users, who may like the look and
feel
> > of the machines but have no way of knowing if they are really secure."
> >
> > Dr. Rubin, who also appeared on the same 60 Minutes program, has
advocated
> > the use of electronic voting machines that also produce a voter
verifiable
> > paper record of the vote.
> >
> > Ms. McCormack dismissed the threat of vote tampering with paperless
systems.
> > She feels it would be too obvious for a voter to tamper with a system in
the
> > voting booth. This misses the real threat of a malicious insider
rigging
> > the machines. Slot machines -- which undergo more testing and scrutiny
than
> > voting machines -- have been rigged from time to time. In one famous
case,
> > an employee of the Gaming Control Board in the Electronic Services
Division
> > in Las Vegas rigged machines without touching them. The cheating
program
> > was installed by unwitting employees using a rigged testing device. The
> > scam was only discovered years later when the perpetrator became greedy
and
> > sloppy.
> >
> > "With so much at stake in elections, the malicious insider threat is
very
> > high," says Dechert. "Ms. McCormack says, 'there is no evidence,' but
we
> > may not see any evidence until long after Election Day. What
contingency
> > plans do election officials have should it be discovered later that an
> > election was rigged?"
> >
> > The Open Voting Consortium is a Nonprofit California Corporation
dedicated
> > to the development, maintenance, and delivery of open voting systems for
use
> > in public elections.
> > ###
> >
> >
>
>
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Received on Tue Nov 30 23:17:29 2004

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