Re: Secure logging (was: King COunty)

From: Fred McLain <mclain_at_zipcon_dot_net>
Date: Thu Nov 11 2004 - 23:01:30 CST

Err.. Ed, I was talking about a paper trail for the tally system
events. This doesn't have much to do with the voting machines
themselves. I think we have that pretty well covered. The recording
and witnessing of the tally would probably cover the physical security
issue, so I guess I was being overly paranoid there.

        -Fred-

On Thu, 2004-11-11 at 10:41, Edward Cherlin wrote:
> On Tuesday 09 November 2004 06:11 pm, Fred McLain wrote:
> > A safe, inexpensive and well tested mechanism exists for
> > logging, cash register printers.
>
> Several DREs have them in the back. They log each vote in
> sequence, but the voter can't check.
>
> > It's not as techie, but they
> > work! Integration of one of these with the tally software we
> > have shouldn't be overly difficult. What might be more
> > interesting is making them physically secure as they are in
> > cash registers.
>
> ROTFL. The checkout clerks replace the tape rolls when they are
> full. The only security on a point-of-purchase machine is
> typically a hardware key, and there are a lot of well-known ways
> to pick a lock or con a clerk into opening the machine for you.
>
> > -Fred-
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Received on Tue Nov 30 23:17:28 2004

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