Re: Secure logging (was: King COunty)

From: Jim March <jmarch_at_prodigy_dot_net>
Date: Wed Nov 10 2004 - 16:42:56 CST

Alan Dechert wrote:

>We've discussed this at some length over the last year or so. Opponents of
>the paper printout like to carry around this 56 inch 2.5 in. tape (which is
>about what you'd need in some jurisdictions with very long ballots -- e.g.,
>Bernalillo in NM 78 contests, bi-lingual). I showed how the longest ballot
>anyone every came up with could be formatted on one side of a legal sized
>sheet. Tapes are very bad from a handling view point -- for recounts and
>such. You can put the rolls so that the paper is not cut (reel to reel) a
>la the Sequoia system in NV, but preserving the order of the vote is widely
>thought to be a no-no.
>Alan D.

Alan, I think we're on different pages here.

We're discussing how the central tabulator needs to keep an uneditable
audit log. There's three competing proposals:

1) Paper log (cash register tape type).

2) Write it to a read/write device (hard disk, USB memory stick, etc)
and use strong crypto to prevent it's being edited/erased.

3) Write it to a write-once medium that physically can't be erased, such
as a standard CD or DVD burner.

I like number three, myself. ALL are better than Diebold's "write it to
a hard drive and cripple what security MS-Access provides, which wasn't
much to start with...". Diebold's audit log process is going to get
serious scrutiny as people realize we've got a documented case of it
being edited on election night (three hours smoked!) in King County WA.

I recommend OVC have some sort of "official take" on audit logs handy in
case the King County/Diebold situation grows wings.

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Received on Tue Nov 30 23:17:25 2004

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