Re: Secure logging (was: King COunty)

From: Alan Dechert <alan_at_openvotingconsortium_dot_org>
Date: Wed Nov 10 2004 - 16:14:55 CST

> There is a lot of charm to a cash register like trail.
> The upsides include
> Existing & commodity hardened printers.
> The downsides include
> Difficulty to re-read (I suspect, but it wouldn't be hard to build a
> 2.5" wide paper roll reader).
> Dependency on consumables, both paper and ink to operate (or thermal
> paper).
> Slow paper tape would work if we needed to audit the booth, but
> could be too slow for detail logging during the BRP.
> Paper is relatively easy to damage, and easy to select point of
> damage if human readable stream.
We've discussed this at some length over the last year or so. Opponents of
the paper printout like to carry around this 56 inch 2.5 in. tape (which is
about what you'd need in some jurisdictions with very long ballots -- e.g.,
Bernalillo in NM 78 contests, bi-lingual). I showed how the longest ballot
anyone every came up with could be formatted on one side of a legal sized
sheet. Tapes are very bad from a handling view point -- for recounts and
such. You can put the rolls so that the paper is not cut (reel to reel) a
la the Sequoia system in NV, but preserving the order of the vote is widely
thought to be a no-no.

Alan D.
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Received on Tue Nov 30 23:17:25 2004

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