Re: Fwd: [Votingtech] AVANTE on VVPR Implementation - A WP

From: Mason Miller <miller_at_netstreet_dot_net>
Date: Sat Nov 29 2003 - 14:27:21 CST

Also, in following the threads online, it appears that each ballot is
going to be stored as an individual file. We should keep several log
files that contain the digital sigs and checksums for each of the votes
as they are cast. Also one xml doc that contains ALL of the votes for
that machine would be useful. Combining all of these we should be able
to build meaningful audit and recount tools.


On Nov 29, 2003, at 3:15 PM, Alan Dechert wrote:

> This is a product of monumental stupidity. They want to make a case
> for
> using a $900 hammer where a hammer is not the appropriate tool anyway.
> Any jurisdictions that buy this crap should have all the officials
> involved
> fired/recalled or run out of town -- tarred and feathered.
> There are so many problems with this approach, it's difficult to know
> where
> to start. For one thing, the purpose of the paper just isn't clear.
> Is it
> the real ballot? Apparently not. You vote when you punch the "CAST
> button on the DRE. The OVC system is clear on this point. When you
> punch
> the "PRINT MY BALLOT" button, you are not casting your vote. You get
> the
> "OFFICIAL BALLOT" out of the printer. You vote by dropping the OFFICIAL
> BALLOT in the ballot box.
> This part is patently absurd:
>> . AVANTE believes that it is even more critical that
>> visually impaired voters be read back their vote on
>> paper so that they too can be assured that the vote
>> is cast and recorded as he/she intended.
> Saltman says, "such a printout is a sop to the layperson ignorant of
> the
> inner workings of computers."
> (see #7 here)
> You cannot verify the vote by listening to your selections read back
> on the
> machine where you indicated your selections. All you are getting is an
> indication that the machine knows what selections you intended. This
> may or
> may not have anything to do with how the vote is recorded.
> If you can't read the paper ballot, the only way to verify what's on
> the
> paper is to have the selections read back on a machine that has no
> connection to the machine on which you indicated your selections and
> has no
> other way to know about those selections.
> In the above referenced Saltman paper, he goes on to say, "There must
> be
> better ways of providing the necessary confidence to the voters. It
> is the
> intention of this paper to propose some." In the next part #8, Saltman
> describes a system where the voter get the ballot verified on an
> "independently programmed" device. And, he says, "A system such as
> this has
> been proposed by Alan Dechert for use in California."
> For more on what Salman has had to say about this, see this letter he
> wrote
> in 2001:
> SaltmanLetterToBerdahl.asp
> In summary, Avante urges customers to spend $5,500 on an invalid
> system.
> The OVC will provide a valid one for a small fraction of the cost.
> Alan D.
>> Hi all,
>> The following is a white paper on VVPAT as implemented by Avante. FYI.
>> Dennis Paull
> ....
>> Avante has written a white paper on how to implement VVPR.
>> It can be found at
> On%20the%20voter%20verifiable%20paper%20record%20FINAL.pdf
>> Comments are sought and are welcome.
= The content of this message, with the exception of any external
= quotations under fair use, are released to the Public Domain
Received on Sun Nov 30 23:17:12 2003

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