Re: Ballot Reconciliation Procedure

From: Alan Dechert <alan_at_openvotingconsortium_dot_org>
Date: Fri Nov 28 2003 - 04:28:59 CST

>
> > The barcode on each ballot is scanned and an XML ballot image is created
> > with the same format and file naming scheme as on the voting machine.
>
> Having the same name bothers me because of makes it more difficult to do a
> forensic review/audit of a failure. My gut tells me that the file names,
> and the data itself should indicate the source.
>
Probably a good idea. Easy to implement even for the demo -- say a one
character prefix added to the names of the voting machine ballot image files
and a different one character prefix added to the names of the barcode data
ballot image files, while the final resultant files could drop the prefix
and have the name as proposed before. Also, indicate the source within the
XML file.

> Yes, the directory already identifies the source, but in systems like this
> I believe that it's best if there is lots of information redundancy.
>
Got it.

> > The list of 30 unmatched ballot numbers...
>
> Has anyone considered whether it would be useful, feasible (or a source of
> attack) if the number of sheets of paper in the printer were known before
> the polling station opened and when it closed?
>
No. We've thought about using paper that is "special" in some easily
recognizable way. The before and after count might be useful information
but I'm not sure how valuable it would be versus the additional
administrative hassle -- which would be substantial when you start thinking
of procedures to develop for when the count doesn't add up.

Alan D.
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Received on Sun Nov 30 23:17:11 2003

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