Re: electronically detecting tampering

From: Karl Auerbach <karl_at_cavebear_dot_com>
Date: Fri Nov 28 2003 - 03:26:58 CST

Let me add another concern:

> * Illegal modification of the ballots (insert, update, and delete
> operations on ballots)
> - Electronic ballots
> + During local creation/storage
> + During transmission
> - Physical ballots (ballot-box stuffing/destruction)

Invalidation of ballots that are otherwise valid. One, at first thought,
might consider this a form of "update". However, I'm thinking of things
that would not change the recorded ballot itself but rather change its
context in some way in which it is either rejected outright during the
counting or recounting phase or is susceptable to a challange.

For example, here in Santa Cruz we use an optical sense card - we use a
special black or purple pen to color in the little bubbles on an IBM card.
Suppose someone were to go into the booth and change the pen to a red pen.
The ballots marked with the red pen might misread or could be challanged.

A similar thing could happen in an electronic voting system. Suppose the
voting machine glitched (intentionally or accidently) and shifted its
clock? Suppose I brought a few rare earth magnets into the booth and
slapped 'em onto the side of a CRT to shift the display to one side or
another (thus causing a misalignment of the display and the touch-screen


> * Monitoring people's vote (via easter eggs or numbers to identity a
> voter's ballot)
> - Inferring votes via timestamp information (i.e. if time or sequence
> information is recoverable from a collection of ballots, this can
> be correlated with a covert videotape of all the people who enter
> the polling place).
> * Being able to verify that all ballots were counted
> * Removing the "black box" aspect to electronic voting. To me this
> refers to voters not being able to see how the electrons are stored
> on disk to verify the votes they casted are accurate.
> An unrelated (or only very loosely related) issue is:
> * Validating accuracy of system in recording voter intent.
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Received on Sun Nov 30 23:17:11 2003

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