Re: Ballot Reconciliation Procedure

From: Alan Dechert <alan_at_openvotingconsortium_dot_org>
Date: Thu Nov 27 2003 - 14:54:20 CST


> > The voting machines will be booted from a CD that contains the OS,
> > machine software, and ballot data. When the polls close, the ballot
> > are written to the CD during the voting machine shut down procedure.
> This does something important: it will make sure the right ballots are in
> precinct's ballot box. It does not make sure that, later, the votes are
> at a central authority. My gut feeling is that we will solve both issues
> are in the ballot box, and the ballots are counted) with another plan and
> procedure will be redundant.
There WILL BE redundant checks.

Here's another piece of it in case you haven't read about it:

Once the paper ballots have been matched with their corresponding XML ballot
images, the precinct report will be generated and transmitted to county HQ.
This report will consolidate the data that's on the ballots (I hesitate to
use the word "tabulation" because it would be meaningless to report IRV
results, for example, but we CAN report all the selections that were made on
all the ballots).

The county will then produce a report that accumulates all the data on all
precinct reports. Then, after the ballots arrive at county HQ, another
tally is made from the individual ballots. The tally from the individual
ballots MUST MATCH the accumulated precinct report tally. Again, keep in
mind that this is a tally of the raw data on the ballots -- independent of
election method.

Any alteration of a ballot in between the precinct and the county HQ would
be detected since the two tallies would not match.

This is an important part of the security plan and WILL BE PART OF THE DEMO.

Alan D.
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Received on Sun Nov 30 23:17:11 2003

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