Re: On privacy v Accuracy

From: David Webber \(XML\) <"David>
Date: Mon May 23 2005 - 14:27:53 CDT


You need to read the TLV process please.

That is exactly what the TLV is saying.

However - notice that what I was indicating was a
*fundamental* architectural difference - not a
referencing of what shabby procedures are de rigour
in the industry.

Also VVPAT is *not* a safe guard by itself -
witness how Diebolds vision of VVPAT /
VVAATT is a travesty, and an insulting abomination -

So its vital we spell out what the *process* is -
and how paper ballots are a core basis of that.

That is what TLV is looking to create - a formal specification
and a clear articulation of the steps, mechanisms, and
formally verifable process.

Thanks, DW
  ----- Original Message -----
  From: Teresa Hommel
  To: David Webber (XML) ; Open Voting Consortium discussion list
  Sent: Monday, May 23, 2005 3:09 PM
  Subject: Re: [OVC-discuss] On privacy v Accuracy

  Wrong. The difference between electronic banking and electronic voting is that banking systems are audited and voting systems are not. The concept of the VVPB allows each voter to view their ballot. If the VVPB once cast were handled, stored, and counted before multipartisan observers, that would constitute an appropriate auditing mechanism and you would have a secure system. The electronic vote tallies could help by providing a second level of audit to point up instances where, due to discrepancies, either the electronic or paper ballots were not correctly handled or counted.

  Teresa Hommel

  David Webber (XML) wrote:


Good points. To me this is the crux of what we are working on.

I.e. the difference between electronic banking and its accuracy
      and electronic voting and accurate counts is the fact that
      we absolutely require secret ballots, unlike banking systems
      where the transactions are exposed.

So - to remediate this we need to have a system that provides
accounting levels of reconcilation by induction, while at
the same time retaining absolute separation between counting
sources so they represent independently gathered totals.
These three sources are - electoral roll counts, paper ballots,
and electronic entry records. Crosschecking between the
three then provides the ability to diagnose and track the
process itself.

Another fundamental accounting principle is the one
involving crosschecking between two or more actors
in the process. Again - by linking citizens and election staff
physically into the process - we ensure that opportunities
for solely machine directed fraud are minimized. This is
why it is so important for voters to directly verify voting
on multiple levels - not delegate it to machines.

This is one key factor I see in enforcing cast paper ballots.
A machine cannot "walk" ballots into a ballot box - it has
to have a human intermediary.

Conversely - if humans manipulate the paper ballots in the
ballot box, you have to have the machine "know" about
those manipulations too.

And providing a 100% built-in audit system that requires
every vote to be counted and those totals crosschecked
between the three counting sources as a matter of course,
not as an occasional exception.

All this is woven into the fabric of the TLV approach.

Nothing is ever 100% - but certainly my hope is that it
represents a vastly better improvement compared to
today's systems that lack these fundamental pillars
of trust.

Cheers, DW

  What we need is more facts. Perhaps someday we can secure
ballots, using open software and a robust audit capability, to
the point where the results are not routinely called into
question, without having to provide for routine outside
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Received on Tue May 31 23:17:46 2005

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