Re: On privacy v Accuracy

From: Teresa Hommel <tahommel_at_earthlink_dot_net>
Date: Mon May 23 2005 - 14:09:20 CDT

Wrong. The difference between electronic banking and electronic voting
is that banking systems are audited and voting systems are not. The
concept of the VVPB allows each voter to view their ballot. If the VVPB
once cast were handled, stored, and counted before multipartisan
observers, that would constitute an appropriate auditing mechanism and
you would have a secure system. The electronic vote tallies could help
by providing a second level of audit to point up instances where, due to
discrepancies, either the electronic or paper ballots were not correctly
handled or counted.

Teresa Hommel

David Webber (XML) wrote:

>Edward,
>
>Good points. To me this is the crux of what we are working on.
>
>I.e. the difference between electronic banking and its accuracy
> and electronic voting and accurate counts is the fact that
> we absolutely require secret ballots, unlike banking systems
> where the transactions are exposed.
>
>So - to remediate this we need to have a system that provides
>accounting levels of reconcilation by induction, while at
>the same time retaining absolute separation between counting
>sources so they represent independently gathered totals.
>These three sources are - electoral roll counts, paper ballots,
>and electronic entry records. Crosschecking between the
>three then provides the ability to diagnose and track the
>process itself.
>
>Another fundamental accounting principle is the one
>involving crosschecking between two or more actors
>in the process. Again - by linking citizens and election staff
>physically into the process - we ensure that opportunities
>for solely machine directed fraud are minimized. This is
>why it is so important for voters to directly verify voting
>on multiple levels - not delegate it to machines.
>
>This is one key factor I see in enforcing cast paper ballots.
>A machine cannot "walk" ballots into a ballot box - it has
>to have a human intermediary.
>
>Conversely - if humans manipulate the paper ballots in the
>ballot box, you have to have the machine "know" about
>those manipulations too.
>
>And providing a 100% built-in audit system that requires
>every vote to be counted and those totals crosschecked
>between the three counting sources as a matter of course,
>not as an occasional exception.
>
>All this is woven into the fabric of the TLV approach.
>
>Nothing is ever 100% - but certainly my hope is that it
>represents a vastly better improvement compared to
>today's systems that lack these fundamental pillars
>of trust.
>
>Cheers, DW
>
>
>
>>>What we need is more facts. Perhaps someday we can secure
>>>ballots, using open software and a robust audit capability, to
>>>the point where the results are not routinely called into
>>>question, without having to provide for routine outside
>>>analysis.
>>>
>>>
>
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>
>

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Received on Tue May 31 23:17:46 2005

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