Re: Fwd: Should candidates challenge elections?

From: Edward Cherlin <cherlin_at_pacbell_dot_net>
Date: Sun May 22 2005 - 03:15:31 CDT

On Thursday 19 May 2005 09:47, David Mertz wrote:
> On May 19, 2005, at 5:58 AM, Edward Cherlin wrote:
> > Slicing also removes any association between votes and
> > security. The sliced data is precisely what you get from a
> > DRE:
> That's really not fair. Pieces of paper, even if divided into
> smaller sections (I like the perforation thing that Jim March
> had raised; multiple pre-cut peformations are possible), have
> a physical chain-of-custody and transparency to them. The
> lock on the ballot box doesn't stop working because the paper
> put in it was torn along the perforated line before it was
> placed in the box.

That takes us back to publicly unauditable paper. We would know
no more than whether the total number of votes for any candidate
is less than the number of signatures in the registration book.
If there is only one copy of the paper, it cannot be compared
with the electronic records.

Wait, I exaggerate. The hash of all the votes together could
still be valid. But a lot of auditing detail is lost.

There is no perfect solution. Rather than fight about little bits
of the problem, we would do better to get our security audit
going, and find out what the consequences of our choices might
be. Then we will not be spinning theories in the air, making it
up as we go along.

> ---
> Dred Scott 1857; Santa Clara 1886; Plessy 1892;
> Korematsu 1944; Eldred 2003

More to the point, Bush v Gore 2000

Edward Cherlin
Generalist & activist--Linux, languages, literacy and more
"A knot! Oh, do let me help to undo it!"
--Alice in Wonderland
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Received on Tue May 31 23:17:44 2005

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