Re: Ballot tear-off (David Mertz)

From: David Webber \(XML\) <"David>
Date: Fri May 20 2005 - 14:16:45 CDT


I like what you are saying here. To me this is the basis for
emphasizing the process and procedural aspects - and
what I've been striving toward with the TLV work - to
create a trusted process that has built-in safeguards
because of the way it is architected, not despite the way!

By creating three separate sets of counting records around
the voting process - all must tally in order for one to have
confidence. As with accounting - getting everything to
agree to the exact penny can be tricky - but if you know
that you have everything accounted for and good reasons
to for things that appear out and those are documented,
then you have a very high degree of confidence.

I believe we can do all that and still retain 100%
anonymous voting.

Thanks, DW

> You're right, Marty, about the unanimous thing. If you fully protect
> anonymity, proving votes is (by definition) not possible. Actual 100%
> votes are rare, so that's a corner case. But we've certainly seen real
> life examples where a vote is claimed 90%, but there sure *seem* to be
> more than 10% of the voting populous who insist they voted otherwise.
> That's a bad situation (and often, indeed, fraud is going on)... the
> solution is having the right set of complete procedures in place, NOT
> compromising individual anonymous ballots.

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Received on Tue May 31 23:17:44 2005

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