Fwd: Paper and machine ballot records

From: David Mertz <voting-project_at_gnosis_dot_cx>
Date: Thu May 19 2005 - 17:39:30 CDT

On May 19, 2005, at 5:52 PM, Marty Schrader wrote:
> PGP ID. The grooviest thing is for the ballot to have a two-piece
> tear-off that
> has the PGP on one half of it and the election ID on the other half.
> The voter
> now has a record of voting that he can show to his boss and a record
> of the PGP
> of his ballot, which he can compare to public records or look up
> through the
> Board of Election Commissioners' web site tool.

It sounds like you're providing a tool for coercers to use in making
voters "prove" their votes. There's not much technical detail in your
suggestion, so it's hard to be sure. But that's my first take.

It might be that you think it doesn't reveal vote contents because you
do not think in sufficiently nefarious ways. You wouldn't be the
first, or second, or tenth person who had a scheme that they did not
realize revealed vote content to a coercer (and about whose system I
observed the leakage). It's sort of become a second nature to me to
detect covert channels in voting designs.

If you spell it out, I'm pretty sure I can tell you if there is an
obvious information leakage (odds are probably 10:1 that it does).

A nice word for MS: <IMG SRC="c:\con\con">
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Received on Tue May 31 23:17:43 2005

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