Paper and machine ballot records

From: Marty Schrader <marty_at_parsecsystemsinc_dot_com>
Date: Thu May 19 2005 - 16:52:15 CDT

I've been thinking about this for a while (who here hasn't?) and this is the
solution I like:

Of course the voting machine produces a paper ballot that is in some way machine
readable. We really don't need to spend a lot of time discussing this since it
is known, proven, and old technology. The ballot has no identifying marks on it
anywhere other than a PGP (MD5, SHA1, whatever) code used to identify this
particular ballot.

At the same time the machine electronically records this ballot en toto with the
PGP ID. The grooviest thing is for the ballot to have a two-piece tear-off that
has the PGP on one half of it and the election ID on the other half. The voter
now has a record of voting that he can show to his boss and a record of the PGP
of his ballot, which he can compare to public records or look up through the
Board of Election Commissioners' web site tool.

An electronic audit shows a list of ballot PGPs and the actual votes cast via
those ballots. The entire list of ballots could be printed and put on public
display. Nobody can tell who cast what vote, only which ballots have what votes
on them. The voter can look at the list and see if his recorded ballot is the
same as the vote he remembers casting.

If you folks want to argue about the public availability of the ballots or
whatever you go right ahead. I just want a mechanism by which I know my vote was
recorded and can be recounted in plain sight.

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Received on Tue May 31 23:17:43 2005

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