Re: Crypto codes #1

From: charlie strauss <cems_at_earthlink_dot_net>
Date: Thu May 19 2005 - 13:36:36 CDT

I'm not sure I understood the entire context of the discussion but one thing cuaght my eye:

"2) Each ballot contains (as printed strings or in a barcode):
>
> for bv = ballot-id + vote-string:
> e = encrypt(k, hash(bv))
> print bv + hash(bv) + e
>
> (3) At finalization, k is revealed publicly.

If the hash function is known or knowable does not this reveal you ballot and provide a effective receipt? That is to say it's going to be fairly trivial, by crypto standards to invert the hash of a ballot string I would suspect.

Perhaps this relies on the hash function being machine specific and undiscoverable? is the point that the machine can determine if a ballot came from it even if it has no record of the vote? This seems like a odd thing to want.

please explain what the objective is and how its' different than VOTEHERE.

_______________________________________________
OVC discuss mailing lists
Send requests to subscribe or unsubscribe to arthur@openvotingconsortium.org
==================================================================
= The content of this message, with the exception of any external
= quotations under fair use, are released to the Public Domain
==================================================================
Received on Tue May 31 23:17:42 2005

This archive was generated by hypermail 2.1.8 : Tue May 31 2005 - 23:17:52 CDT