Polling stations and fraud - TLV

From: David Webber \(XML\) <"David>
Date: Thu May 19 2005 - 08:43:29 CDT

Ron,

I was concerned about possible attacks to the TLV approach
via the electoral roll after comments you made yesterday - but
on reflection - I believe I have reconciled these.

Clearly the total # of votes cast cannot exceed the voters
coming thru a particular location voting station. So we
have that crosscheck.

What if they do however?! That means some ballots are
"surplus". To find out what happened the voting records would
need to be examined along with their paper equivalents -
in detail - time consuming but the only way to weed out
any pattern.

The risk here to the fraudster is pretty high - because someone
had to cast paper ballots in, and also cause matching electronic
records too. So a physical presence is required at the polling
station, and collaboration with computer operator to add records
and print out the matching ballots (unlike in todays DREs were
it can all be remotely managed).

Similarly adding head count to the electoral roll is risky. If
you add fake people and then voted for them - that would
be the "safest" - clearly voting for real people runs the risk
of them showing up to vote too!

While this is all possible and would result if done expertly -
in potentially undetectable fraud - the risks involved - and
the number of people required - make the chances that
someone will whistle blow probably unacceptably high.
Especially as this is not "invisible"- because the tampering
to the electoral roll does leave a "footprint".

Just some thoughts!

DW

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Received on Tue May 31 23:17:42 2005

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