Re: list of things for new people to read

From: Edmund R. Kennedy <ekennedyx_at_yahoo_dot_com>
Date: Mon May 09 2005 - 10:07:44 CDT

Hello:

If the Wiki was up, that would help a lot. In the
meantime, the FAQ's at the web site are good.

Thanks, Ed Kennedy

--- Lara Shaffer <lara@openvotingconsortium.org>
wrote:

> Hi all,
> Could someone compile a list of things for new OVC
> discuss list people to
> read? I know Arthur and others have made
> suggestions, but I think it would
> be good to have a compiled list for people to go
> through.
> At the conferences I've been going to, I've met
> some really intelligent
> people that I think should join the OVC discuss
> list. Though they might
> make some suggestions that have already been
> discussed, their perspective as
> a new person to the project should be very valuable.
> Let's get a list of things together for Clint
> Curtis, Chick Westover and
> other new people (I met two more people in Ohio I
> invited to join).
>
> Lara :)
>
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: <ovc-discuss-request@listman.sonic.net>
> To: <ovc-discuss@listman.sonic.net>
> Sent: Sunday, May 08, 2005 8:13 PM
> Subject: OVC-discuss Digest, Vol 7, Issue 54
>
>
> > Send OVC-discuss mailing list submissions to
> > ovc-discuss@listman.sonic.net
> >
> > To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide
> Web, visit
> >
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> > or, via email, send a message with subject or body
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> >
> > When replying, please edit your Subject line so it
> is more specific
> > than "Re: Contents of OVC-discuss digest..."
> >
> >
> > Today's Topics:
> >
> > 1. Re: Shamos Rebuttal, Draft 3 (Kathy Dopp)
> > 2. Re: New to group (Ed Kennedy)
> > 3. RE: New to group
> (clintcurtis@clintcurtis.com)
> > 4. Re: Shamos Rebuttal, Draft 3 (Ron Crane)
> >
> >
> >
>
----------------------------------------------------------------------
> >
> > Message: 1
> > Date: Sun, 08 May 2005 12:54:11 -0600
> > From: Kathy Dopp <kathy@uscountvotes.org>
> > Subject: Re: [OVC-discuss] Shamos Rebuttal, Draft
> 3
> > To: Open Voting Consortium discussion list
> > <ovc-discuss@listman.sonic.net>
> > Message-ID: <427E6053.2030001@uscountvotes.org>
> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=windows-1252;
> format=flowed
> >
> > Ron Crane wrote:
> >
> > >
> > > I disagree with some other edits.
> > >
> > > I am deleting the last item in 5. It's a minor
> point, and I refuse to
> > > cite any improperly-conducted poll (such as the
> ACM's poll on paper
> > > trails) in any formal paper.
> > >
> > > The qualifications you added to the conclusion
> weaken it
> > > substantially, and introduce terms not elsewhere
> defined ("auditable
> > > dual data paths", "Best Practices").
> > >
> > > Finally, I am a little confused by your edit in
> 3.3.
> >
> >
> > IMO, when you do not accept the edits that people
> make - then not many
> > people will be willing to co-sign or make use of
> your document.
> >
> > You should try as much as possible to bend over
> backwards to accept at
> > least partially, or figure out how to incorporate,
> all the points that
> > you are given.
> >
> > Your paper does not sound at all professional if
> you overstate things by
> > refusing to qualify what needs qualifying IMO.
> And anyone who feels
> > that qualifications are needed when you refuse to
> add them because you
> > feel it will weaken the argument, makes your paper
> less likely to be
> > agreed to, less likely to be used, and makes it
> sound less professional
> > and less strong than if you acknowledge all the
> points in it.
> >
> > I've personally been the writer for many
> collaborative documents of PhD
> > computer scientists and PhD mathematicians on the
> voting and elections
> > issues over the prior year. It takes a huge amount
> of time and
> > intellectual work to figure out ways to come to
> agreement and to
> > incorporate everyones' points, but if you want
> everyone to sign it with
> > you and you want it to be a useful document, you
> must acknowledge all
> > their points in some manner in your paper, and not
> be so quick to
> > dismiss the edits people give you in their
> entirety. Figure out ways to
> > understand and incorporate their points.
> >
> > I apologize for the unasked (and perhaps
> unwelcome) advice.
> >
> > Kathy
> >
> >
> > ------------------------------
> >
> > Message: 2
> > Date: Sun, 8 May 2005 17:33:39 -0700
> > From: "Ed Kennedy" <ekennedyx@yahoo.com>
> > Subject: Re: [OVC-discuss] New to group
> > To: "Open Voting Consortium discussion list"
> > <ovc-discuss@listman.sonic.net>
> > Message-ID:
> <000b01c5542e$bf4fe440$6401a8c0@homet3uj9pkik9>
> > Content-Type: text/plain; format=flowed;
> charset="iso-8859-1";
> > reply-type=original
> >
> > Hello Curtis:
> >
> > Welcome aboard Curtis. Are you the Clint Curtis
> referred to here:
> >
>
http://bradblogtoo.blogspot.com/2004/12/breaking-update-clint-curtis-stuns.h
> tml?
> > Also, when you say DOT are you referring to a
> Department of
> Transportation,
> > such as FDOT? I'm sure by now you've read our FAQ
> on our web site so you
> > are pretty much up to speed on the basics. For
> more information you can
> > also check our searchable correspondence archive
> at:
> > http://gnosis.python-hosting.com/voting-project/.
> We have had extensive
> > discussions over the issue of bar codes versus OCR
> so if you weigh in on
> > that (after searching the issue in the archives
> please) I know the rest of
> > us would be grateful.
> > --
> >
> > Thanks, Edmund R. Kennedy
> >
> > Always work for the common good.
> >
> > 10777 Bendigo Cove
> > San Diego, CA 92126-2510
> > USA
> >
> > I blog now and then at:
> <http://ekennedyx.blogspot.com/>
> > ----- Original Message -----
> > From: <clintcurtis@clintcurtis.com>
> > To: <ovc-discuss@listman.sonic.net>
> > Sent: Sunday, May 08, 2005 1:52 PM
> > Subject: [OVC-discuss] New to group
> >
> >
> > > My name is Clint Curtis. I am new to the group
> so it will take me a
> > > while to get up to speed on what you are doing.
> > >
> > > What I have been proposing is simple open source
> software that is
> > > running on a non-networked non-propriety system.
> This system could be
> > > done entirely on surplus equipment and thus
> bring the cost to the
> > > states down to something that is hard for anyone
> to refuse.
> > >
> > > One key element is that it would print two
> receipts. One used for the
> > > official ballot which would be spot checked
> against the machine totals
> > > (counts should match exactly) and the other to
> be preserved for open
> > > inspection by any interested party (party as in
> person not necessarily
> > > as in political). In the event that the spot
> checks prove the machine
> > > totals to be in error, a hand recount can be
> mandated.
> > >
> > > I am not a fan of the scanning technology. The
> touch screens can be
> > > provided for next to nothing and can be equipped
> with a JAWS system
> > >
>
(http://www.freedomscientific.com/fs_products/software_jaws.asp),
> which
> > > will make it accessible to the blind. Scanners
> are inherently
> > > proprietary and thus add an extra layer of
> invisibility that can be
> > > attacked by those with the money and motivation
> to do so. Might be
> > > useful to spot check the touch screen count but
> my experience using
> > > OCR, barcode, and positional mapping (while
> doing doc management at
> > > NASA and DOT) was that their reliability would
> be less than perfect.
> > > Have not looked at the systems in the last
> couple of years but I
> > > believe the totals would need to match exactly
> in order restore
> > > confidence in the voting system.
> > >
> > > That is where my position has been but I am
> eager to continue to monitor
> > > the discussion group and learn better ways.
> > >
> > > Clint
> > >
> > >
> > > _______________________________________________
> > > OVC discuss mailing lists
> > > Send requests to subscribe or unsubscribe to
> > > arthur@openvotingconsortium.org
> >
> >
> >
> > ------------------------------
> >
> > Message: 3
> > Date: Sun, 8 May 2005 17:49:37 -0700
> > From: clintcurtis@clintcurtis.com
> > Subject: RE: [OVC-discuss] New to group
> > To: Open Voting Consortium discussion list
> > <ovc-discuss@listman.sonic.net>
> > Message-ID:
> >
>
<20050509004937.1416.qmail@webmail11.prod.mesa1.secureserver.net>
> > Content-Type: TEXT/plain; CHARSET=US-ASCII
> >
> > Yes, I'm the guy reffered to on BradBlog. I'll
> look over
> > http://gnosis.python-hosting.com/voting-project/
> archive.
> > Thanks,
> >
> > Clint
> >
> > > -------- Original Message --------
> > > Subject: Re: [OVC-discuss] New to group
> > > From: "Ed Kennedy" <ekennedyx@yahoo.com>
> > > Date: Sun, May 08, 2005 8:33 pm
> > > To: "Open Voting Consortium discussion list"
> > > <ovc-discuss@listman.sonic.net>
> > >
> > > Hello Curtis:
> > >
> > > Welcome aboard Curtis. Are you the Clint Curtis
> referred to here:
> > >
>
http://bradblogtoo.blogspot.com/2004/12/breaking-update-clint-curtis-stuns.h
> tml?
> > > Also, when you say DOT are you referring to a
> Department of
> Transportation,
> > > such as FDOT? I'm sure by now you've read our
> FAQ on our web site so
> you
> > > are pretty much up to speed on the basics. For
> more information you can
> > > also check our searchable correspondence archive
> at:
> > >
> http://gnosis.python-hosting.com/voting-project/.
> We have had extensive
> > > discussions over the issue of bar codes versus
> OCR so if you weigh in on
> > > that (after searching the issue in the archives
> please) I know the rest
> of
> > > us would be grateful.
> > > --
> > >
> > > Thanks, Edmund R. Kennedy
> > >
> > > Always work for the common good.
> > >
> > > 10777 Bendigo Cove
> > > San Diego, CA 92126-2510
> > > USA
> > >
> > > I blog now and then at:
> <http://ekennedyx.blogspot.com/>
> > > ----- Original Message -----
> > > From: <clintcurtis@clintcurtis.com>
> > > To: <ovc-discuss@listman.sonic.net>
> > > Sent: Sunday, May 08, 2005 1:52 PM
> > > Subject: [OVC-discuss] New to group
> > >
> > >
> > > > My name is Clint Curtis. I am new to the group
> so it will take me a
> > > > while to get up to speed on what you are
> doing.
> > > >
> > > > What I have been proposing is simple open
> source software that is
> > > > running on a non-networked non-propriety
> system. This system could be
> > > > done entirely on surplus equipment and thus
> bring the cost to the
> > > > states down to something that is hard for
> anyone to refuse.
> > > >
> > > > One key element is that it would print two
> receipts. One used for the
> > > > official ballot which would be spot checked
> against the machine totals
> > > > (counts should match exactly) and the other to
> be preserved for open
> > > > inspection by any interested party (party as
> in person not necessarily
> > > > as in political). In the event that the spot
> checks prove the machine
> > > > totals to be in error, a hand recount can be
> mandated.
> > > >
> > > > I am not a fan of the scanning technology. The
> touch screens can be
> > > > provided for next to nothing and can be
> equipped with a JAWS system
> > > >
>
(http://www.freedomscientific.com/fs_products/software_jaws.asp),
> which
> > > > will make it accessible to the blind. Scanners
> are inherently
> > > > proprietary and thus add an extra layer of
> invisibility that can be
> > > > attacked by those with the money and
> motivation to do so. Might be
> > > > useful to spot check the touch screen count
> but my experience using
> > > > OCR, barcode, and positional mapping (while
> doing doc management at
> > > > NASA and DOT) was that their reliability would
> be less than perfect.
> > > > Have not looked at the systems in the last
> couple of years but I
> > > > believe the totals would need to match exactly
> in order restore
> > > > confidence in the voting system.
> > > >
> > > > That is where my position has been but I am
> eager to continue to
> monitor
> > > > the discussion group and learn better ways.
> > > >
> > > > Clint
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> _______________________________________________
> > > > OVC discuss mailing lists
> > > > Send requests to subscribe or unsubscribe to
> > > > arthur@openvotingconsortium.org
> > >
> > > _______________________________________________
> > > OVC discuss mailing lists
> > > Send requests to subscribe or unsubscribe to
> arthur@openvotingconsortium.org
> >
> >
> >
> > ------------------------------
> >
> > Message: 4
> > Date: Sun, 8 May 2005 18:13:20 -0700
> > From: Ron Crane <voting@lastland.net>
> > Subject: Re: [OVC-discuss] Shamos Rebuttal, Draft
> 3
> > To: Open Voting Consortium discussion list
> > <ovc-discuss@listman.sonic.net>
> > Message-ID:
> <886BB4B2-C027-11D9-ADE4-000A95B95AD8@lastland.net>
> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
> >
> > On May 8, 2005, at 2:11 PM, Edward Cherlin wrote:
> >
> > > It is proverbial in the computer business
> (unlike politics) that
> > > incompetence is to be suspected before
> malice....[an] on-line poker
> > > establishment used a dud shuffling
> > > algorithm and an even dudder
> random-number-generator-seed
> > > selection method in a system for Texas Hold'em
> where a player's
> > > computer could determine the current seed in
> real time, and thus
> > > know the entire deal (every player's hand and
> the shared cards)
> > > in advance. They say they got a lot of media
> coverage.
> > >
> > > So we should not focus only on the malicious
> vendor. The known
> > > incompetent vendors together with the known
> malicious/corrupt
> > > politicians with the money to hire corrupt
> programmers and other
> > > technical people are here.
> >
> > I'm focussing on the potentially malicious vendor
> because Shamos
> > implies that we generally should trust vendors,
> and we need to
> > discredit this dangerous idea. On the other hand,
> he criticizes vendor
> > incompetence (e.g., s.1.5), so I don't see that
> it's so important to
> > explore that area -- in this paper. Were I writing
> a general overview
> > of voting system security, I'd want to cover all
> these areas, and more.
> >
> > > On Saturday 07 May 2005 14:30, Ron Crane wrote:
> > >
> > >> I would like to describe instances of gambling
> machine
> > >> cheating, but not the one about Ron Harris. The
> reason is that
> > >> 3.5.1 advocates requiring intrusive inspection
> of voting
> > >> machines along the same lines as gambling
> machines, which are
> > >> thus inspected by the Nevada Gaming Control
> Board. But Harris
> > >> did his cheating while working for the Board,
> and using its
> > >> inspection equipment to insert his cheating
> code. This
> > >> introduces a difficult rhetorical issue that
> would make us
> > >> look like we're talking out of both sides of
> our mouths.
> > >
> > > I thought the idea was to advocate a completely
> open process,
> > > i.e. publishing source code, at a minimum, and
> Open Source
> > > licensing, for preference. Harris is the perfect
> example of why
> > > *nobody* in the voting business should be
> trusted *without
> > > verification*. So if it looks like we are
> talking out of both
> > > sides of our mouth, nix the idea of relying on
> intrusive
> > > government inspection, and emphasize even more
> the need for
> > > vigilance by citizens, and therefore the need
> for an opportunity
> > > for vigilance.
> > >
> > > I just looked up Harris. He was supposed to
> verify EPROMS in slot
> > > machines in Nevada, but he reprogrammed some of
> them. This is
> > > precisely the sort of thing we are trying to
> prevent. Sure,
> > > Harris did it on his own, but his technique
> demonstrates how a
> > > crooked vendor or election official could do it.
> Or how a
> > > political operative could get a job as a Trusted
> Person in order
> > > have the opportunity to mess with the machines
> in a close
> > > election. Harris also read the dud random number
> generation code
> > > for some of the machines, and figured out how to
> predict Keno
> > > results.
> >
> > I think we need both intrusive government
> inspection and citizen
> > vigilance. But this discussion has helped me
> figure out how to use the
> > Harris example without ditching government
> inspection. Thanks!
> >
> > >> If
> > >> you know of other instances of gambling machine
> cheating that
> > >> involve vendors, please bring them up.
> > >
> > > It didn't take me long to find these through
> Google.
> > > http://www.casinogaming.com/features/blackbook/
> > > "After a slot machine maker rigged electronic
> poker machines ten
> > > years ago to limit the number of jackpots,
> Nevada regulators set
> > > technical standards for gaming machines."....
> >
> > Good stuff.
> >
> > >
> > >> Some of the other changes tend to defocus the
> argument, such
> > >> as the comments about the Founders
> > >
> > > The comment about the Founders was a replacement
> for a far less
> > > focussed clause about relegating the issue to
> academic
> > > discussion. No, this was a real live issue back
> then, discussed
> > > in the Federalist Papers, in its analysis of how
> each branch of
> > > the Federal government could and should act to
> keep the others
> > > from becoming tyrannical and oppressive, and
> elsewhere in public
> > > discussion. Jefferson, in particular, went on
> about the problem
> > > (not vote fraud, specifically, but any
> usurpation of power) for
> > > the rest of his life. Something about
> fertilizing the tree of
> > > Liberty with the blood of tyrants, IIRC.
> >
> > But the passage you edited concerned Shamos's
> comment on illegitimate
> > presidencies, an issue I don't think the Founders
> debated at all. "Best
> > left as an academic exercise..." was meant to say
> that we should, at
> > all costs, avoid putting ourselves in a position
> where we would have to
> > consider the question in earnest.
> >
> > >> and 'Reflections on Trusting Trust'.
> > >
> > > Not mine. In fact, I don't see it in the paper.
> What are you
> > > referring to?
> >
> > Your edit in 3.2 says, in part, "but attacks on
> such verification
> > systems are also known,[Thompson, Turing Award
> lecture] if the compiler
> > and libraries are not also subject to detailed
> inspection." That sure
> > looks like a reference to Reflections on Trusting
> Trust.
> > http://www.acm.org/classics/sep95/ .
> >
> > >> Generally I want to keep the focus on dishonest
> vendors (as
> > >> opposed to politicans and voting officials),
> since Shamos's
> > >> main argument is that, with a few tweaks,
> vendors can be
> > >> trusted. They must not be, and their global
> reach implies a
> > >> global reach for potential vendor fraud.
> > >
> > > We must also be vigilant against vendor
> incompetence that allows
> > > others to cheat, a known phenomenon since the
> invention of the
> > > first mechanical voting machine.
> >
> > See above.
> >
> > >> I disagree with some other edits. For example,
> on average, the
> > >> incentive to verify votes is substantially
> weaker than the
> > >> incentive to verify financial transactions.
> Almost everyone
> > >> cares about her money, while many (a majority,
> in most cases)
> > >> don't care enough about voting even to cast a
> ballot.
> > >
> > > I wrote, "similarly, while some highly-motivated
> voters always
> > > will wish to verify whether their votes properly
> are counted,
> > > many others will not." Also, "Designing a system
> that will
> > > uncover fraud with the likely rather small
> fraction of voters
> > > checking is highly desirable and definitely
> possible." Doesn't
> > > that agree with what you say?
> >
> > It agrees, but is inappropriately weak. Also your
> deletion of the
> > sentence about eroding vigilance removes an
> important qualification.
> > The second sentence ("Designing a system...")
> confuses the argument,
> > which contrasts systems that process financial
> transactions (e.g.,
> > check clearing) with *existing* voting systems.
> The second sentence
> > proposes a way in which voting systems might be
> made more like
> > financial systems, and thus scatters and weakens
> the argument. We have
> > to refute Shamos's arguments as they are, not
> artificially strengthen
> > them and then try to refute the strengthened
> versions.
> >
> > >> I don't
> > >> want explicitly to raise "the possibility of an
> alliance
> > >> between vendors and political parties or even
> administrations,
> > >> as in disputed elections in Central Asia....";
> it will sound
> > >> too much like "conspiracy theories" to many
> readers.
> > >
> > > Even if you're paranoid, there may still be
> somebody out to get
> > > you. ^_^
> >
> > True. But we also should be careful not to set off
> readers'
> > improbability detectors, or they are likely to
> dismiss the entire
> > paper.
> >
> > > Part of our point is that much of the public and
> most of those
> > > with technical knowledge and understanding are
> already highly
> > > suspicious (with good reason), not only of the
> machines, but of
> > > the vendors, the politicians, and voting
> officials (many of whom
> > > belong in jail right now, including substantial
> parts of the
> > > Florida and Ohio administrations). But I was
> willing to be
> > > distant and polite in the paper, and stick with
> undisputed
> > > facts. [snip stuff along the same lines]
> >
> > There is good reason to be suspicious. But we
> should be careful not to
> > overstate what is documented, nor to come off as
> conspiracy theorists.
> >
> > >> The
> > >> qualification about one-party districts is an
> oxymoron: the
> > >> voting system knows the parties involved in
> each election, so
> > >> it's not going to shift votes between parties
> if there isn't
> > >> more than one party involved (e.g., during a
> primary
> > >> election).
> > >
> > > You mean single-district elections for
> legislators? That isn't
> > > what I was talking about. I meant one party
> districts
> > > (registration of actual population) in
> multi-party elections
> > > over larger areas. Well, if you can't understand
> what I wrote,
> > > it must need clarification.
> >
> > I find it difficult to believe that low
> single-digit shifts between the
> > major parties would ring alarm bells anywhere in
> the United States.
> > There are more than a few Democrats in the most
> Republican of places
> > (e.g., Utah: Bush 72%, Kerry 26%), and more than a
> few Republicans in
> > the most Democratic of places (e.g., San
> Francisco: Kerry 83%, Bush
> > 15%). If the 11% swing in Cleland/Chambliss didn't
> ring bells, why is
> > 1-2% going to?
> >
> > >> I strongly disagree with your deletion of the
> > >> argument about vendors distributing Trojan
> Horses along with
> > >> regular updates; it is a perfect subterfuge.
> > >
> > > Regular updates without testing are illegal. It
> is a strawman
> > > waiting to be knocked down.
> >
> > Testing is very unlikely to discover all but the
> most
> > incompetently-designed Trojan Horses. Further,
> vendors already have
> > been caught applying illegal patches, as Jim March
> has documented. The
> > "strawman" still stands.
> >
> > >> "Cheating with
> > >> triggers" requires vendor-provided malware,
> > >
> > > Malware provided by somebody, not necessarily a
> vendor....
> >
> > It still requires the cooperation of many more
> parties than malware
> > that operates without user-invoked triggers, and
> thus is likely to
> > "trigger" the view that we're conspiracy
> theorists.
> >
> > >> Also it will read like
> > >> conspiracy theories to many, since it requires
> many
> > >> individuals to cooperate to produce any
> significant effect.
> > >
> > > CREEP, the Plumbers, the whole Nixon White
> House, Donald
> > > Segretti's distributed dirty tricks in
> particular..."Landslide"
> > > Lyndon Johnson and his pet shyster, Abe
> Fortas...The Kingfish,
> > > Boss Tweed...Don't tell me it hasn't happened,
> and don't tell me
> > > it isn't still happening.
> >
> > I'm NOT telling you "it hasn't happened". I'm
> telling you that
> > emphasizing this stuff will make us sound wacky to
> some readers. If we
> > show (as we do) the practicality of malware that
> doesn't require
> > triggers, we have, by implication, shown the
> practicality of malware
> > that does require triggers. And we've avoided most
> of the
> > cloak-and-dagger stuff to boot.
> >
> > >> I am deleting the last item in 5. It's a minor
> point, and I
> > >> refuse to cite any improperly-conducted poll
> (such as the
> > >> ACM's poll on paper trails) in any formal
> paper.
> > >
> > > You refuse to *mention* it with appropriate
> qualifications? I
> > > wrote, "Although no strong statistical inference
> of confidence
> > > within a few percent can be drawn from such
> data, it certainly
> > > has the appearance of contradicting Shamos's
> assertion that most
> > > of this population are undecided." What's wrong
> with that?
> >
> > It leaves us vulnerable to reassertion of Shamos's
> original point about
> > "9,999 of 10,000" computer scientists "remaining
> open-minded on the
> > subject" (or whatever he said). But, worse,
> "within a few percent" is
> > just incorrect. Responders to the ACM's poll were
> entirely
> > self-selected, leaving us unable to draw any
> useful statistical
> > conclusions from it, let alone "within a few
> percent". The only
> > appropriate qualification for that poll is not to
> use it. And, since
> > the entire point is really a tempest in a teacup,
> and it lengthens the
> > paper, it's not worth keeping.
> >
> > >> The qualifications you added to the conclusion
> weaken it
> > >> substantially, and introduce terms not
> elsewhere defined
> > >> ("auditable dual data paths", "Best
> Practices").
> > >
> > > Well, let's define them, then. I want to be able
> to make an
> > > explicit comparison of dual data paths with
> double-entry
> > > bookkeeping. Having two sets of data is the
> essence of
> > > auditability. Best Practices is a standard term
> in matters of
> > > government regulation....
> >
> > Then maybe there needs to be an explicit
> discussion of the auditing
> > capabilities that paper ballots/trails add, which
> would be used to
> > refute Shamos's argument that paper adds nothing
> but trouble. A few
> > concise paragraphs along these lines would fit in
> 3.1.1. I'm glad to
> > include them if you write them.
> >
> > >> Finally, I am a little confused by your edit in
> 3.3. Earlier
> > >> you blasted [1] my comparison between software
> and bridges,
> > >> saying that, "among historians of bridge
> engineering it fails
> > >> the laugh test--in fact the guffaw, hoot, and
> holler, pounding
> > >> on the floor with tears in your eyes test." But
> your edit
> > >> leaves the comparison intact, with a general
> qualification
> > >> "normally" (which, BTW, is already implied by
> the footnote),
> > >> and the addition of a description of the Tacoma
> Narrows bridge
> > >> - and its mechanism of failure - that only
> confuses the
> > >> argument.
> > >
> > > Well, you can take out Galloping Gertie, but we
> need at least one
> > > example, unless we take bridges out completely.
> The Nimitz
> > > collapse would do....
> >
> > I don't understand the point. It just confuses the
> issue and undermines
> > the comparison between continuous and discrete
> systems. Footnote 37
> > already qualifies that comparison, noting that
> some continuous systems
> > (e.g., global climate) are chaotic. It also notes
> that bridges
> > specifically are engineered for stability within
> (and well beyond)
> > their intended operating ranges. That some bridges
> have failed due to
> > improper design does not invalidate the
> continuous/discrete comparison.
> > If you know of something that does invalidate it,
> we should, of course,
> > use another comparison.
> >
> > >> I'll kick out another draft tomorrow.
> > >>
> > >> -R
> > >>
> > >> [1] I (and probably others) would be happier at
> OVC if our
> > >> discussions contained rather less dragon-fire.
> > >
> > > Marry, say not so, good sir. The very thought
> woundeth me. ;->
> >
> > As one wit paraphrased Gandalf: "Meddle not in the
> affairs of dragons,
> > for you are crunchy and taste good with ketchup".
> >
> > -R
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> > ------------------------------
> >
> > _______________________________________________
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> >
> > End of OVC-discuss Digest, Vol 7, Issue 54
> > ******************************************
> >
>
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