list of things for new people to read

From: Lara Shaffer <lara_at_openvotingconsortium_dot_org>
Date: Mon May 09 2005 - 02:00:52 CDT

Hi all,
  Could someone compile a list of things for new OVC discuss list people to
read? I know Arthur and others have made suggestions, but I think it would
be good to have a compiled list for people to go through.
   At the conferences I've been going to, I've met some really intelligent
people that I think should join the OVC discuss list. Though they might
make some suggestions that have already been discussed, their perspective as
a new person to the project should be very valuable.
  Let's get a list of things together for Clint Curtis, Chick Westover and
other new people (I met two more people in Ohio I invited to join).

Lara :)

----- Original Message -----
From: <ovc-discuss-request@listman.sonic.net>
To: <ovc-discuss@listman.sonic.net>
Sent: Sunday, May 08, 2005 8:13 PM
Subject: OVC-discuss Digest, Vol 7, Issue 54

> Send OVC-discuss mailing list submissions to
> ovc-discuss@listman.sonic.net
>
> To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit
> http://lists.sonic.net/mailman/listinfo/ovc-discuss
> or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to
> ovc-discuss-request@listman.sonic.net
>
> You can reach the person managing the list at
> ovc-discuss-owner@listman.sonic.net
>
> When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific
> than "Re: Contents of OVC-discuss digest..."
>
>
> Today's Topics:
>
> 1. Re: Shamos Rebuttal, Draft 3 (Kathy Dopp)
> 2. Re: New to group (Ed Kennedy)
> 3. RE: New to group (clintcurtis@clintcurtis.com)
> 4. Re: Shamos Rebuttal, Draft 3 (Ron Crane)
>
>
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> Message: 1
> Date: Sun, 08 May 2005 12:54:11 -0600
> From: Kathy Dopp <kathy@uscountvotes.org>
> Subject: Re: [OVC-discuss] Shamos Rebuttal, Draft 3
> To: Open Voting Consortium discussion list
> <ovc-discuss@listman.sonic.net>
> Message-ID: <427E6053.2030001@uscountvotes.org>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=windows-1252; format=flowed
>
> Ron Crane wrote:
>
> >
> > I disagree with some other edits.
> >
> > I am deleting the last item in 5. It's a minor point, and I refuse to
> > cite any improperly-conducted poll (such as the ACM's poll on paper
> > trails) in any formal paper.
> >
> > The qualifications you added to the conclusion weaken it
> > substantially, and introduce terms not elsewhere defined ("auditable
> > dual data paths", "Best Practices").
> >
> > Finally, I am a little confused by your edit in 3.3.
>
>
> IMO, when you do not accept the edits that people make - then not many
> people will be willing to co-sign or make use of your document.
>
> You should try as much as possible to bend over backwards to accept at
> least partially, or figure out how to incorporate, all the points that
> you are given.
>
> Your paper does not sound at all professional if you overstate things by
> refusing to qualify what needs qualifying IMO. And anyone who feels
> that qualifications are needed when you refuse to add them because you
> feel it will weaken the argument, makes your paper less likely to be
> agreed to, less likely to be used, and makes it sound less professional
> and less strong than if you acknowledge all the points in it.
>
> I've personally been the writer for many collaborative documents of PhD
> computer scientists and PhD mathematicians on the voting and elections
> issues over the prior year. It takes a huge amount of time and
> intellectual work to figure out ways to come to agreement and to
> incorporate everyones' points, but if you want everyone to sign it with
> you and you want it to be a useful document, you must acknowledge all
> their points in some manner in your paper, and not be so quick to
> dismiss the edits people give you in their entirety. Figure out ways to
> understand and incorporate their points.
>
> I apologize for the unasked (and perhaps unwelcome) advice.
>
> Kathy
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 2
> Date: Sun, 8 May 2005 17:33:39 -0700
> From: "Ed Kennedy" <ekennedyx@yahoo.com>
> Subject: Re: [OVC-discuss] New to group
> To: "Open Voting Consortium discussion list"
> <ovc-discuss@listman.sonic.net>
> Message-ID: <000b01c5542e$bf4fe440$6401a8c0@homet3uj9pkik9>
> Content-Type: text/plain; format=flowed; charset="iso-8859-1";
> reply-type=original
>
> Hello Curtis:
>
> Welcome aboard Curtis. Are you the Clint Curtis referred to here:
>
http://bradblogtoo.blogspot.com/2004/12/breaking-update-clint-curtis-stuns.h
tml?
> Also, when you say DOT are you referring to a Department of
Transportation,
> such as FDOT? I'm sure by now you've read our FAQ on our web site so you
> are pretty much up to speed on the basics. For more information you can
> also check our searchable correspondence archive at:
> http://gnosis.python-hosting.com/voting-project/. We have had extensive
> discussions over the issue of bar codes versus OCR so if you weigh in on
> that (after searching the issue in the archives please) I know the rest of
> us would be grateful.
> --
>
> Thanks, Edmund R. Kennedy
>
> Always work for the common good.
>
> 10777 Bendigo Cove
> San Diego, CA 92126-2510
> USA
>
> I blog now and then at: <http://ekennedyx.blogspot.com/>
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: <clintcurtis@clintcurtis.com>
> To: <ovc-discuss@listman.sonic.net>
> Sent: Sunday, May 08, 2005 1:52 PM
> Subject: [OVC-discuss] New to group
>
>
> > My name is Clint Curtis. I am new to the group so it will take me a
> > while to get up to speed on what you are doing.
> >
> > What I have been proposing is simple open source software that is
> > running on a non-networked non-propriety system. This system could be
> > done entirely on surplus equipment and thus bring the cost to the
> > states down to something that is hard for anyone to refuse.
> >
> > One key element is that it would print two receipts. One used for the
> > official ballot which would be spot checked against the machine totals
> > (counts should match exactly) and the other to be preserved for open
> > inspection by any interested party (party as in person not necessarily
> > as in political). In the event that the spot checks prove the machine
> > totals to be in error, a hand recount can be mandated.
> >
> > I am not a fan of the scanning technology. The touch screens can be
> > provided for next to nothing and can be equipped with a JAWS system
> > (http://www.freedomscientific.com/fs_products/software_jaws.asp), which
> > will make it accessible to the blind. Scanners are inherently
> > proprietary and thus add an extra layer of invisibility that can be
> > attacked by those with the money and motivation to do so. Might be
> > useful to spot check the touch screen count but my experience using
> > OCR, barcode, and positional mapping (while doing doc management at
> > NASA and DOT) was that their reliability would be less than perfect.
> > Have not looked at the systems in the last couple of years but I
> > believe the totals would need to match exactly in order restore
> > confidence in the voting system.
> >
> > That is where my position has been but I am eager to continue to monitor
> > the discussion group and learn better ways.
> >
> > Clint
> >
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > OVC discuss mailing lists
> > Send requests to subscribe or unsubscribe to
> > arthur@openvotingconsortium.org
>
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 3
> Date: Sun, 8 May 2005 17:49:37 -0700
> From: clintcurtis@clintcurtis.com
> Subject: RE: [OVC-discuss] New to group
> To: Open Voting Consortium discussion list
> <ovc-discuss@listman.sonic.net>
> Message-ID:
> <20050509004937.1416.qmail@webmail11.prod.mesa1.secureserver.net>
> Content-Type: TEXT/plain; CHARSET=US-ASCII
>
> Yes, I'm the guy reffered to on BradBlog. I'll look over
> http://gnosis.python-hosting.com/voting-project/ archive.
> Thanks,
>
> Clint
>
> > -------- Original Message --------
> > Subject: Re: [OVC-discuss] New to group
> > From: "Ed Kennedy" <ekennedyx@yahoo.com>
> > Date: Sun, May 08, 2005 8:33 pm
> > To: "Open Voting Consortium discussion list"
> > <ovc-discuss@listman.sonic.net>
> >
> > Hello Curtis:
> >
> > Welcome aboard Curtis. Are you the Clint Curtis referred to here:
> >
http://bradblogtoo.blogspot.com/2004/12/breaking-update-clint-curtis-stuns.h
tml?
> > Also, when you say DOT are you referring to a Department of
Transportation,
> > such as FDOT? I'm sure by now you've read our FAQ on our web site so
you
> > are pretty much up to speed on the basics. For more information you can
> > also check our searchable correspondence archive at:
> > http://gnosis.python-hosting.com/voting-project/. We have had extensive
> > discussions over the issue of bar codes versus OCR so if you weigh in on
> > that (after searching the issue in the archives please) I know the rest
of
> > us would be grateful.
> > --
> >
> > Thanks, Edmund R. Kennedy
> >
> > Always work for the common good.
> >
> > 10777 Bendigo Cove
> > San Diego, CA 92126-2510
> > USA
> >
> > I blog now and then at: <http://ekennedyx.blogspot.com/>
> > ----- Original Message -----
> > From: <clintcurtis@clintcurtis.com>
> > To: <ovc-discuss@listman.sonic.net>
> > Sent: Sunday, May 08, 2005 1:52 PM
> > Subject: [OVC-discuss] New to group
> >
> >
> > > My name is Clint Curtis. I am new to the group so it will take me a
> > > while to get up to speed on what you are doing.
> > >
> > > What I have been proposing is simple open source software that is
> > > running on a non-networked non-propriety system. This system could be
> > > done entirely on surplus equipment and thus bring the cost to the
> > > states down to something that is hard for anyone to refuse.
> > >
> > > One key element is that it would print two receipts. One used for the
> > > official ballot which would be spot checked against the machine totals
> > > (counts should match exactly) and the other to be preserved for open
> > > inspection by any interested party (party as in person not necessarily
> > > as in political). In the event that the spot checks prove the machine
> > > totals to be in error, a hand recount can be mandated.
> > >
> > > I am not a fan of the scanning technology. The touch screens can be
> > > provided for next to nothing and can be equipped with a JAWS system
> > > (http://www.freedomscientific.com/fs_products/software_jaws.asp),
which
> > > will make it accessible to the blind. Scanners are inherently
> > > proprietary and thus add an extra layer of invisibility that can be
> > > attacked by those with the money and motivation to do so. Might be
> > > useful to spot check the touch screen count but my experience using
> > > OCR, barcode, and positional mapping (while doing doc management at
> > > NASA and DOT) was that their reliability would be less than perfect.
> > > Have not looked at the systems in the last couple of years but I
> > > believe the totals would need to match exactly in order restore
> > > confidence in the voting system.
> > >
> > > That is where my position has been but I am eager to continue to
monitor
> > > the discussion group and learn better ways.
> > >
> > > Clint
> > >
> > >
> > > _______________________________________________
> > > OVC discuss mailing lists
> > > Send requests to subscribe or unsubscribe to
> > > arthur@openvotingconsortium.org
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > OVC discuss mailing lists
> > Send requests to subscribe or unsubscribe to
arthur@openvotingconsortium.org
>
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 4
> Date: Sun, 8 May 2005 18:13:20 -0700
> From: Ron Crane <voting@lastland.net>
> Subject: Re: [OVC-discuss] Shamos Rebuttal, Draft 3
> To: Open Voting Consortium discussion list
> <ovc-discuss@listman.sonic.net>
> Message-ID: <886BB4B2-C027-11D9-ADE4-000A95B95AD8@lastland.net>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
>
> On May 8, 2005, at 2:11 PM, Edward Cherlin wrote:
>
> > It is proverbial in the computer business (unlike politics) that
> > incompetence is to be suspected before malice....[an] on-line poker
> > establishment used a dud shuffling
> > algorithm and an even dudder random-number-generator-seed
> > selection method in a system for Texas Hold'em where a player's
> > computer could determine the current seed in real time, and thus
> > know the entire deal (every player's hand and the shared cards)
> > in advance. They say they got a lot of media coverage.
> >
> > So we should not focus only on the malicious vendor. The known
> > incompetent vendors together with the known malicious/corrupt
> > politicians with the money to hire corrupt programmers and other
> > technical people are here.
>
> I'm focussing on the potentially malicious vendor because Shamos
> implies that we generally should trust vendors, and we need to
> discredit this dangerous idea. On the other hand, he criticizes vendor
> incompetence (e.g., s.1.5), so I don't see that it's so important to
> explore that area -- in this paper. Were I writing a general overview
> of voting system security, I'd want to cover all these areas, and more.
>
> > On Saturday 07 May 2005 14:30, Ron Crane wrote:
> >
> >> I would like to describe instances of gambling machine
> >> cheating, but not the one about Ron Harris. The reason is that
> >> 3.5.1 advocates requiring intrusive inspection of voting
> >> machines along the same lines as gambling machines, which are
> >> thus inspected by the Nevada Gaming Control Board. But Harris
> >> did his cheating while working for the Board, and using its
> >> inspection equipment to insert his cheating code. This
> >> introduces a difficult rhetorical issue that would make us
> >> look like we're talking out of both sides of our mouths.
> >
> > I thought the idea was to advocate a completely open process,
> > i.e. publishing source code, at a minimum, and Open Source
> > licensing, for preference. Harris is the perfect example of why
> > *nobody* in the voting business should be trusted *without
> > verification*. So if it looks like we are talking out of both
> > sides of our mouth, nix the idea of relying on intrusive
> > government inspection, and emphasize even more the need for
> > vigilance by citizens, and therefore the need for an opportunity
> > for vigilance.
> >
> > I just looked up Harris. He was supposed to verify EPROMS in slot
> > machines in Nevada, but he reprogrammed some of them. This is
> > precisely the sort of thing we are trying to prevent. Sure,
> > Harris did it on his own, but his technique demonstrates how a
> > crooked vendor or election official could do it. Or how a
> > political operative could get a job as a Trusted Person in order
> > have the opportunity to mess with the machines in a close
> > election. Harris also read the dud random number generation code
> > for some of the machines, and figured out how to predict Keno
> > results.
>
> I think we need both intrusive government inspection and citizen
> vigilance. But this discussion has helped me figure out how to use the
> Harris example without ditching government inspection. Thanks!
>
> >> If
> >> you know of other instances of gambling machine cheating that
> >> involve vendors, please bring them up.
> >
> > It didn't take me long to find these through Google.
> > http://www.casinogaming.com/features/blackbook/
> > "After a slot machine maker rigged electronic poker machines ten
> > years ago to limit the number of jackpots, Nevada regulators set
> > technical standards for gaming machines."....
>
> Good stuff.
>
> >
> >> Some of the other changes tend to defocus the argument, such
> >> as the comments about the Founders
> >
> > The comment about the Founders was a replacement for a far less
> > focussed clause about relegating the issue to academic
> > discussion. No, this was a real live issue back then, discussed
> > in the Federalist Papers, in its analysis of how each branch of
> > the Federal government could and should act to keep the others
> > from becoming tyrannical and oppressive, and elsewhere in public
> > discussion. Jefferson, in particular, went on about the problem
> > (not vote fraud, specifically, but any usurpation of power) for
> > the rest of his life. Something about fertilizing the tree of
> > Liberty with the blood of tyrants, IIRC.
>
> But the passage you edited concerned Shamos's comment on illegitimate
> presidencies, an issue I don't think the Founders debated at all. "Best
> left as an academic exercise..." was meant to say that we should, at
> all costs, avoid putting ourselves in a position where we would have to
> consider the question in earnest.
>
> >> and 'Reflections on Trusting Trust'.
> >
> > Not mine. In fact, I don't see it in the paper. What are you
> > referring to?
>
> Your edit in 3.2 says, in part, "but attacks on such verification
> systems are also known,[Thompson, Turing Award lecture] if the compiler
> and libraries are not also subject to detailed inspection." That sure
> looks like a reference to Reflections on Trusting Trust.
> http://www.acm.org/classics/sep95/ .
>
> >> Generally I want to keep the focus on dishonest vendors (as
> >> opposed to politicans and voting officials), since Shamos's
> >> main argument is that, with a few tweaks, vendors can be
> >> trusted. They must not be, and their global reach implies a
> >> global reach for potential vendor fraud.
> >
> > We must also be vigilant against vendor incompetence that allows
> > others to cheat, a known phenomenon since the invention of the
> > first mechanical voting machine.
>
> See above.
>
> >> I disagree with some other edits. For example, on average, the
> >> incentive to verify votes is substantially weaker than the
> >> incentive to verify financial transactions. Almost everyone
> >> cares about her money, while many (a majority, in most cases)
> >> don't care enough about voting even to cast a ballot.
> >
> > I wrote, "similarly, while some highly-motivated voters always
> > will wish to verify whether their votes properly are counted,
> > many others will not." Also, "Designing a system that will
> > uncover fraud with the likely rather small fraction of voters
> > checking is highly desirable and definitely possible." Doesn't
> > that agree with what you say?
>
> It agrees, but is inappropriately weak. Also your deletion of the
> sentence about eroding vigilance removes an important qualification.
> The second sentence ("Designing a system...") confuses the argument,
> which contrasts systems that process financial transactions (e.g.,
> check clearing) with *existing* voting systems. The second sentence
> proposes a way in which voting systems might be made more like
> financial systems, and thus scatters and weakens the argument. We have
> to refute Shamos's arguments as they are, not artificially strengthen
> them and then try to refute the strengthened versions.
>
> >> I don't
> >> want explicitly to raise "the possibility of an alliance
> >> between vendors and political parties or even administrations,
> >> as in disputed elections in Central Asia...."; it will sound
> >> too much like "conspiracy theories" to many readers.
> >
> > Even if you're paranoid, there may still be somebody out to get
> > you. ^_^
>
> True. But we also should be careful not to set off readers'
> improbability detectors, or they are likely to dismiss the entire
> paper.
>
> > Part of our point is that much of the public and most of those
> > with technical knowledge and understanding are already highly
> > suspicious (with good reason), not only of the machines, but of
> > the vendors, the politicians, and voting officials (many of whom
> > belong in jail right now, including substantial parts of the
> > Florida and Ohio administrations). But I was willing to be
> > distant and polite in the paper, and stick with undisputed
> > facts. [snip stuff along the same lines]
>
> There is good reason to be suspicious. But we should be careful not to
> overstate what is documented, nor to come off as conspiracy theorists.
>
> >> The
> >> qualification about one-party districts is an oxymoron: the
> >> voting system knows the parties involved in each election, so
> >> it's not going to shift votes between parties if there isn't
> >> more than one party involved (e.g., during a primary
> >> election).
> >
> > You mean single-district elections for legislators? That isn't
> > what I was talking about. I meant one party districts
> > (registration of actual population) in multi-party elections
> > over larger areas. Well, if you can't understand what I wrote,
> > it must need clarification.
>
> I find it difficult to believe that low single-digit shifts between the
> major parties would ring alarm bells anywhere in the United States.
> There are more than a few Democrats in the most Republican of places
> (e.g., Utah: Bush 72%, Kerry 26%), and more than a few Republicans in
> the most Democratic of places (e.g., San Francisco: Kerry 83%, Bush
> 15%). If the 11% swing in Cleland/Chambliss didn't ring bells, why is
> 1-2% going to?
>
> >> I strongly disagree with your deletion of the
> >> argument about vendors distributing Trojan Horses along with
> >> regular updates; it is a perfect subterfuge.
> >
> > Regular updates without testing are illegal. It is a strawman
> > waiting to be knocked down.
>
> Testing is very unlikely to discover all but the most
> incompetently-designed Trojan Horses. Further, vendors already have
> been caught applying illegal patches, as Jim March has documented. The
> "strawman" still stands.
>
> >> "Cheating with
> >> triggers" requires vendor-provided malware,
> >
> > Malware provided by somebody, not necessarily a vendor....
>
> It still requires the cooperation of many more parties than malware
> that operates without user-invoked triggers, and thus is likely to
> "trigger" the view that we're conspiracy theorists.
>
> >> Also it will read like
> >> conspiracy theories to many, since it requires many
> >> individuals to cooperate to produce any significant effect.
> >
> > CREEP, the Plumbers, the whole Nixon White House, Donald
> > Segretti's distributed dirty tricks in particular..."Landslide"
> > Lyndon Johnson and his pet shyster, Abe Fortas...The Kingfish,
> > Boss Tweed...Don't tell me it hasn't happened, and don't tell me
> > it isn't still happening.
>
> I'm NOT telling you "it hasn't happened". I'm telling you that
> emphasizing this stuff will make us sound wacky to some readers. If we
> show (as we do) the practicality of malware that doesn't require
> triggers, we have, by implication, shown the practicality of malware
> that does require triggers. And we've avoided most of the
> cloak-and-dagger stuff to boot.
>
> >> I am deleting the last item in 5. It's a minor point, and I
> >> refuse to cite any improperly-conducted poll (such as the
> >> ACM's poll on paper trails) in any formal paper.
> >
> > You refuse to *mention* it with appropriate qualifications? I
> > wrote, "Although no strong statistical inference of confidence
> > within a few percent can be drawn from such data, it certainly
> > has the appearance of contradicting Shamos's assertion that most
> > of this population are undecided." What's wrong with that?
>
> It leaves us vulnerable to reassertion of Shamos's original point about
> "9,999 of 10,000" computer scientists "remaining open-minded on the
> subject" (or whatever he said). But, worse, "within a few percent" is
> just incorrect. Responders to the ACM's poll were entirely
> self-selected, leaving us unable to draw any useful statistical
> conclusions from it, let alone "within a few percent". The only
> appropriate qualification for that poll is not to use it. And, since
> the entire point is really a tempest in a teacup, and it lengthens the
> paper, it's not worth keeping.
>
> >> The qualifications you added to the conclusion weaken it
> >> substantially, and introduce terms not elsewhere defined
> >> ("auditable dual data paths", "Best Practices").
> >
> > Well, let's define them, then. I want to be able to make an
> > explicit comparison of dual data paths with double-entry
> > bookkeeping. Having two sets of data is the essence of
> > auditability. Best Practices is a standard term in matters of
> > government regulation....
>
> Then maybe there needs to be an explicit discussion of the auditing
> capabilities that paper ballots/trails add, which would be used to
> refute Shamos's argument that paper adds nothing but trouble. A few
> concise paragraphs along these lines would fit in 3.1.1. I'm glad to
> include them if you write them.
>
> >> Finally, I am a little confused by your edit in 3.3. Earlier
> >> you blasted [1] my comparison between software and bridges,
> >> saying that, "among historians of bridge engineering it fails
> >> the laugh test--in fact the guffaw, hoot, and holler, pounding
> >> on the floor with tears in your eyes test." But your edit
> >> leaves the comparison intact, with a general qualification
> >> "normally" (which, BTW, is already implied by the footnote),
> >> and the addition of a description of the Tacoma Narrows bridge
> >> - and its mechanism of failure - that only confuses the
> >> argument.
> >
> > Well, you can take out Galloping Gertie, but we need at least one
> > example, unless we take bridges out completely. The Nimitz
> > collapse would do....
>
> I don't understand the point. It just confuses the issue and undermines
> the comparison between continuous and discrete systems. Footnote 37
> already qualifies that comparison, noting that some continuous systems
> (e.g., global climate) are chaotic. It also notes that bridges
> specifically are engineered for stability within (and well beyond)
> their intended operating ranges. That some bridges have failed due to
> improper design does not invalidate the continuous/discrete comparison.
> If you know of something that does invalidate it, we should, of course,
> use another comparison.
>
> >> I'll kick out another draft tomorrow.
> >>
> >> -R
> >>
> >> [1] I (and probably others) would be happier at OVC if our
> >> discussions contained rather less dragon-fire.
> >
> > Marry, say not so, good sir. The very thought woundeth me. ;->
>
> As one wit paraphrased Gandalf: "Meddle not in the affairs of dragons,
> for you are crunchy and taste good with ketchup".
>
> -R
> -------------- next part --------------
> A non-text attachment was scrubbed...
> Name: not available
> Type: text/enriched
> Size: 14431 bytes
> Desc: not available
> Url :
http://listman.sonic.net/pipermail/ovc-discuss/attachments/20050508/8dfa6f7a
/attachment.bin
>
> ------------------------------
>
> _______________________________________________
> OVC discussion list
> Send requests to subscribe or unsubscribe to
arthur@openvotingconsortium.org
>
> End of OVC-discuss Digest, Vol 7, Issue 54
> ******************************************
>

_______________________________________________
OVC discuss mailing lists
Send requests to subscribe or unsubscribe to arthur@openvotingconsortium.org
==================================================================
= The content of this message, with the exception of any external
= quotations under fair use, are released to the Public Domain
==================================================================
Received on Tue May 31 23:17:26 2005

This archive was generated by hypermail 2.1.8 : Tue May 31 2005 - 23:17:52 CDT