Re: Brand new concept in audit trails

From: Ed Kennedy <ekennedyx_at_yahoo_dot_com>
Date: Thu May 05 2005 - 23:09:32 CDT

Hello David:

Good points. As problems go, setting up an Aunt Millie system is kind of
low on the basic priorities. I'm not sure that the EVM core program would
even need to 'know' about it as it would be more like a ballot design issue.

-- 
Thanks, Edmund R. Kennedy
Always work for the common good.
10777 Bendigo Cove
San Diego, CA 92126-2510
USA
I blog now and then at: <http://ekennedyx.blogspot.com/>
----- Original Message ----- 
From: "David Mertz" <voting-project@gnosis.cx>
To: "Open Voting Consortium discussion list" <ovc-discuss@listman.sonic.net>
Sent: Thursday, May 05, 2005 10:03 AM
Subject: Re: [OVC-discuss] Brand new concept in audit trails
> On May 5, 2005, at 10:43 AM, Edmund R. Kennedy wrote:
>> OK, I stand corrected on the availability of perforated paper.  However, 
>> I still don't see that
>> paper splitter that everyone is talking about.  Did you really expect 
>> that poll workers are going to tear each and every ballot by hand? 
>> Honestly, I do like the basic simplicity of the idea (shall we call it 
>> 'audit ballots'?) but y'all seem to be proposing some awful complicated 
>> ways to go about it.  Whatever happened to KISS?
>
> I'm not sure what's complicated about poll workers splitting a ballot. 
> Lots of places have a tear off portion of a ballot (usually with the 
> second part just a ballot number or code, not the whole vote).
>
> However, while I don't think perforated paper in various styles is 
> difficult to obtain or separate, I do not actually like Jim's idea 
> overall.  If there is to be an audit copy, perforated paper is better than 
> carbons.  But having watched the discussion, I have not become convinced 
> that an "audit ballot" is useful--or at least not useful enough for the 
> moderate extra handling difficulties.
>
> It seems to me that if laws mandate access to ballots after the election, 
> that access can either be to the original "summary paper ballot" we had 
> considered before (if so, controlled access such as "view only under 
> glass"), or perhaps to a microfilm or photocopy of said ballots.  Making 
> the copy right at the polling place seems to offer very minimal assurance 
> over a single copy that is already inspectible by voters.
>
> I am not -fundamentally- opposed to Jim's audit ballot the way I am to 
> some novice misunderstandings that come up frequently (e.g. taking home a 
> copy of ballot, or overly fancy crypto).  But just as a practical, 
> mechanical question, it doesn't seem worth it.  If some jurisdiction said 
> that's what they wanted, I wouldn't object to certifying such a system as 
> "OVC approved"... but it isn't something I'll actively push for either.
>
> Yours, David...
>
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Received on Tue May 31 23:17:22 2005

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