Re: Brand new concept in audit trails

From: Jim March <jmarch_at_prodigy_dot_net>
Date: Wed May 04 2005 - 22:05:41 CDT

Ron Crane wrote:

> On May 4, 2005, at 3:28 PM, Jim March wrote:
>> Ron Crane wrote:
>>> On May 4, 2005, at 2:54 PM, Jim March wrote:
>>>> Ron Crane wrote:
>>>>> On May 4, 2005, at 2:18 PM, Jim March wrote:
>>>>>> Ron Crane wrote:
>>>>>>> That's a big problem. It's one thing to reduce voting privacy
>>>>>>> for everyone, and something else to reduce privacy such that it
>>>>>>> effects certain parties or candidates more than others. I think
>>>>>>> this kills the carbon-copy scheme, though it still allows for
>>>>>>> the publication of precinct totals. The latter is very
>>>>>>> important, since it permits public verification of the global
>>>>>>> tally.
>>>>>>> -R
>>>>>> No, Ron, it does NOT "kill the carbon copy scheme" or it's
>>>>>> variants because the only thing the duplicate paper is doing is
>>>>>> ensuring the accuracy and hackproofing of a data type ALREADY
>>>>>> declared public record in all 50 states.
>>>>>> Let's be clear: in any state, any county, you can ask for and GET
>>>>>> the votes cast in any precinct you care to name. That's current
>>>>>> law, current procedure.
>>>>> Can I get the *ballots* cast in each precinct? Or only the
>>>>> precinct totals? If the former, then it would seem that my
>>>>> objection already has been overridden.
>>>> Hmmmmmmmmm.
>>>> OK. You HAVE raised an issue here...dunno how important it is.
>>>> Right now, I can ask for "all the votes cast per precinct" and get
>>>> it. If it's a Diebold county I'll get it regurgitated out of GEMS
>>>> so I can't *trust* it, but I'll get it. For now let's assume
>>>> there's no hacking going on.
>>>> I get a "summary printout" that has lines like:
>>>> Precinct: 69 / votes for Bush: 70 / votes for Kerry: 60 /
>>>> votes for (each candidate or ballot measure).
>>>> What I do NOT get is "this guy who voted for Bush also voted for X
>>>> and Y and Z". Or at least...damn, you know...Diebold DOES retain
>>>> that. Dunno if it's public. Hang on, I'm gonna call Bev...
>>>> OK. She says MOST states will indeed reveal that level of detail
>>>> ("full ballot images") if you ask for them specifically. A few
>>>> states consider it confidential. California isn't one of these.
>>>> So at a minimum we're talking about making this more detailed info
>>>> more easily available, but it IS mostly available now and political
>>>> parties and professional campaigns troll that data to learn "how to
>>>> market themselves". Those are the people you have to watch out for
>>>> because in a worst case scenario, those are the guys who decide to
>>>> limit services to you as punishment or in extreme cases harass or
>>>> file false charges or worse.
>>> One question is how long after the election states make this stuff
>>> available. It's useful for *some* degree of coercion all the time,
>>> but if it's not available until 6 months after the election, I think
>>> the issue is rather mitigated. Of course, that wouldn't be as useful
>>> for ensuring election integrity, either.
>> They *must* be made available ASAP after the election and by current
>> law, for the next 22 months after.
>> We need them ASAP to be able to decide whether or not to do an
>> election challenge.
>> OK. Say you ran for Mayor and think you lost by fraud. It'll cost
>> YOU money to challenge because you have to pay for the hand count by
>> elections department staff.
>> Under this "carbon" proposal, you can spot-check precincts yourself
>> or do an unofficial total hand recount if you have enough
>> volunteers. You can assess the situation with no financial OR
>> political risk - the political risk of being seen as a "whiner"
>> (remember the "Sore Loserman" bumper stickers?) if you order a hand
>> recount and still loose.
> I understand that. My issue has to do with current law. Where does "22
> months" come from?

Current Federal law on the retension of data from Federal elections.

> Basically, if current law on the disclosure of *ballots* would permit
> the carbon procedure, I hesitantly will accept it hesitantly because
> of the minor-party coercion issues I listed earlier. If it requires a
> change in current law, I'm going to have to see much better
> justification for its use than I've seen so far.

Well as I said, in California and *most* states there is no legal change
required and the full ballot image data (or the ballots themselves are
legally available for viewing.

>>>>>> ...Now, if you want to argue for the rights of minor-party-voters
>>>>>> and get these records sealed nationally, go for it. That's a
>>>>>> separate issue. I for one will fight you tooth and nail on that
>>>>>> because there would be NO LIMIT WHATSOEVER to vote-hacking by
>>>>>> county elections officials.
>>>>> Let's think about that. With our system, they could cast a bunch
>>>>> of extra votes after the polls close, but not so many as to exceed
>>>>> the number of voters in the precinct. Carbons wouldn't catch that.
>>>>> They could manipulate the totals after tabulation, and the carbons
>>>>> would catch that but you say that ballots are already public
>>>>> record. What do the carbons add? What I am misunderstanding?
>>>> Well you're missing one aspect of how vote security really works.
>>>> It's connected to the volunteer pollworkers. You have four to six
>>>> or so per precinct, "ordinary people" - in order to "paper stuff",
>>>> you have to have them all be crooked. Not too likely, esp. not
>>>> across multiple precincts. At the end of the day these people
>>>> tally up their precinct's votes and post the numbers. If somebody
>>>> tries to stuff more paper in back at elections HQ, the numbers
>>>> won't add up.
>>>> This can be defeated but with good system design it's damned
>>>> difficult. Example: proper audit logs will tell you when each step
>>>> happened, in what order even if they screw around with the PC
>>>> system clock. Proper login IDs will tell you WHO performed what
>>>> step so that if a hack is caught, you catch the perps. Compare and
>>>> contrast with Diebold: editable audit logs, no login security -
>>>> good pollworker paper procedures carefully compared to machine
>>>> records might catch electronic hacking (as happened in Volusia
>>>> County FL in 2000) but the perps won't be. So if you're a perp, go
>>>> ahead and hack, you'll always get away with it and some hacks won't
>>>> get noticed.
>>> Right. And all those reasons tend to mitigate the problem the
>>> carbons are intended to address.
>> Yes, *except* you don't want the non-tech folks to have to trust in a
>> "tech priesthood" of election observers either.
>> Long term that nets you a "two caste" system.
>> This "carbon paper" (more likely the perforated single sheet concept)
>> makes electronic hacking unbelievably difficult.
> You mean it makes it more difficult for elections staff to hack,
> though it doesn't prevent them from stuffing the box. Depending upon
> the precinct, stuffing could be more significant, and it's a hell of a
> lot easier.

Yes but only with the cooperation of volunteer pollworkers. You might
be able to corrupt a precinct or two but it won't be widespread.

> Vendors, of course, can still hack the presentation of the choices, or
> (relying upon most voters not verifying their ballots) just record
> their choices instead of the voter's in the machine and on the
> ballot. Of course OVC won't do that and full open source will keep
> us honest.


>> A step up from the "very difficult" of the original OVC procedure.
>> Second, look at my latest comments to the VSPP including a quote from
>> a Los Angeles memo on electronic voting calling current public
>> confidence "poisoned":
> Interesting stuff.

Thanks. Diebold is a worst-case-scenario in how NOT to do it!

>> I've been talking about the posts on the list with Bev all day
>> today. We have finally got the makings of something she can get
>> enthusiastic about. Now you may see her as an extreme case but Ron,
>> that lady has been ALL over the nation digging into election records
>> on site, examining voting systems, talking to "black hat hackers"
>> about how they'd do attacks...she is freakin' PARANOID and with very
>> good reason.
> There is good reason, especially with respect to vendors, who can
> conduct wholesale fraud with impunity. Local officials can conduct
> local fraud a big concern, but not on the scale of vendor fraud.

The level of local election fraud is quite significant though. You
should share war stories with an elections law attorney like Lowell Finley.

Yes, I think the vendors are an even bigger problem but...county-level
fraud is not an "order of magnatude lesser" problem.

>> You set up something that will satisfy HER and you've really got
>> something special...
> Meaning no disrespect to Bev (who's done great work) or anyone else, I
> will sign off on something that satisfies ME, whether or not it
> satisfies anyone else. I am not awed by authority, only by argument.

Ron, that wasn't why I mentioned her opinions.

Think of OVC as being a marketing company too. We're doing a sales
job. Now think of Bev as the nastiest, most skeptical possible customer
who could ever walk through your door, somebody who eats sales pitches,
chews 'em up and spits 'em out laced with vinegar.

If you can get HER swung over to your side...

> [level snip]
>>> Let's see how the conversation develops. We have to consider how
>>> much security it realistically adds versus its privacy impact,
>>> particularly any discriminatory privacy impact. Those little parties
>>> and unknown candidates are the wellspring of renewal.
>> Yeah. True. But look on the flipside: if election fraud sets in
>> long term, there isn't going to be a "wellspring of renewal" from ANY
>> source. Orwell's "1984" is down that path, or a really nasty civil
>> war. (Do recall that the "wellspring of renewal" for this nation was
>> cannons and the Kentucky Longrifle.)
>> Ron, part of what really scares me is that election-related violence
>> is on the upswing. Elections HQs of both parties are being raided.
>> Tires of vans used for get-out-the-vote drives are being slashed.
>> THIS IS AMERICA, that shit used to be confined to 3rd world
>> countries. Public perception of election systems is coming unglued.
>> I can make a very serious case that "excessive security" in elections
>> is now basically impossible.
> Election-related violence is a *great* reason to *preserve* as much
> privacy as we can, especially for voters aligned with unpopular
> parties or candidates. And if "excessive security" is "basically
> impossible", why not film voters' every move?

OK, you caught me in some hyperbole :).

Still, the situation is grim.

> Let's be very careful what we wish for, and not rush to any
> conclusions. Let's also see what some other OVC supporters think.
> David? Fred? Kelly? Others?
> -R

Yeah :).

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Received on Tue May 31 23:17:19 2005

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