Re: Brand new concept in audit trails

From: Ron Crane <voting_at_lastland_dot_net>
Date: Wed May 04 2005 - 17:13:17 CDT

On May 4, 2005, at 2:54 PM, Jim March wrote:

> Ron Crane wrote:
>> On May 4, 2005, at 2:18 PM, Jim March wrote:
>>> Ron Crane wrote:
>>>> That's a big problem. It's one thing to reduce voting privacy for
>>>> everyone, and something else to reduce privacy such that it effects
>>>> certain parties or candidates more than others. I think this kills
>>>> the carbon-copy scheme, though it still allows for the publication
>>>> of precinct totals. The latter is very important, since it permits
>>>> public verification of the global tally.
>>>> -R
>>> No, Ron, it does NOT "kill the carbon copy scheme" or it's variants
>>> because the only thing the duplicate paper is doing is ensuring the
>>> accuracy and hackproofing of a data type ALREADY declared public
>>> record in all 50 states.
>>> Let's be clear: in any state, any county, you can ask for and GET
>>> the votes cast in any precinct you care to name. That's current
>>> law, current procedure.
>> Can I get the *ballots* cast in each precinct? Or only the precinct
>> totals? If the former, then it would seem that my objection already
>> has been overridden.
> Hmmmmmmmmm.
> OK. You HAVE raised an issue here...dunno how important it is.
> Right now, I can ask for "all the votes cast per precinct" and get it.
> If it's a Diebold county I'll get it regurgitated out of GEMS so I
> can't *trust* it, but I'll get it. For now let's assume there's no
> hacking going on.
> I get a "summary printout" that has lines like:
> Precinct: 69 / votes for Bush: 70 / votes for Kerry: 60 /
> votes for (each candidate or ballot measure).
> What I do NOT get is "this guy who voted for Bush also voted for X and
> Y and Z". Or at least...damn, you know...Diebold DOES retain that.
> Dunno if it's public. Hang on, I'm gonna call Bev...
> OK. She says MOST states will indeed reveal that level of detail
> ("full ballot images") if you ask for them specifically. A few states
> consider it confidential. California isn't one of these.
> So at a minimum we're talking about making this more detailed info
> more easily available, but it IS mostly available now and political
> parties and professional campaigns troll that data to learn "how to
> market themselves". Those are the people you have to watch out for
> because in a worst case scenario, those are the guys who decide to
> limit services to you as punishment or in extreme cases harass or file
> false charges or worse.

One question is how long after the election states make this stuff
available. It's useful for *some* degree of coercion all the time, but
if it's not available until 6 months after the election, I think the
issue is rather mitigated. Of course, that wouldn't be as useful for
ensuring election integrity, either.

>>> ...Now, if you want to argue for the rights of minor-party-voters
>>> and get these records sealed nationally, go for it. That's a
>>> separate issue. I for one will fight you tooth and nail on that
>>> because there would be NO LIMIT WHATSOEVER to vote-hacking by county
>>> elections officials.
>> Let's think about that. With our system, they could cast a bunch of
>> extra votes after the polls close, but not so many as to exceed the
>> number of voters in the precinct. Carbons wouldn't catch that. They
>> could manipulate the totals after tabulation, and the carbons would
>> catch that but you say that ballots are already public record. What
>> do the carbons add? What I am misunderstanding?
> Well you're missing one aspect of how vote security really works.
> It's connected to the volunteer pollworkers. You have four to six or
> so per precinct, "ordinary people" - in order to "paper stuff", you
> have to have them all be crooked. Not too likely, esp. not across
> multiple precincts. At the end of the day these people tally up their
> precinct's votes and post the numbers. If somebody tries to stuff
> more paper in back at elections HQ, the numbers won't add up.
> This can be defeated but with good system design it's damned
> difficult. Example: proper audit logs will tell you when each step
> happened, in what order even if they screw around with the PC system
> clock. Proper login IDs will tell you WHO performed what step so that
> if a hack is caught, you catch the perps. Compare and contrast with
> Diebold: editable audit logs, no login security - good pollworker
> paper procedures carefully compared to machine records might catch
> electronic hacking (as happened in Volusia County FL in 2000) but the
> perps won't be. So if you're a perp, go ahead and hack, you'll always
> get away with it and some hacks won't get noticed.

Right. And all those reasons tend to mitigate the problem the carbons
are intended to address.

>>> Ron, you need to know more about how elections and election
>>> oversight works.
>> Thanks. I'm trying to learn.
>> -R
> Cool. Well you DID raise an interesting issue here and it's one we
> need to pay attention to.

Thanks. I am trying to push secure elections forward, not to troll or
to waste time.

> Ultimately I think the security issue will outweigh this.

Let's see how the conversation develops. We have to consider how much
security it realistically adds versus its privacy impact, particularly
any discriminatory privacy impact. Those little parties and unknown
candidates are the wellspring of renewal.


OVC discuss mailing lists
Send requests to subscribe or unsubscribe to
= The content of this message, with the exception of any external
= quotations under fair use, are released to the Public Domain
Received on Tue May 31 23:17:18 2005

This archive was generated by hypermail 2.1.8 : Tue May 31 2005 - 23:17:52 CDT