Re: Brand new concept in audit trails

From: Teresa Hommel <tahommel_at_earthlink_dot_net>
Date: Wed May 04 2005 - 11:51:32 CDT

Some folks want a "twentifirst century" solution. Why not mandate the
use of camcorders to record the handling of ballots once cast until the
election is certified.

An extra set of ballot images or copies introduces so many issues, and
you can't even get some election people to handle one set.

Teresa Hommel

Jim March wrote:

> Folks,
>
> Bev Harris has been pushing me hard on various OVC issues, but mainly
> the area of "auditability by Aunt Millie" - in other words, can a
> totally techno-incompetent PC-less person trust the election when it
> was done electronically?
>
> Well she and I came up with an answer.
>
> First, this is assuming we're dealing with an "all OVC" system rather
> than a preliminary "stopgap tabulator replacement".
>
> The "terminal" people vote on is the type of box we've been
> discussing, printing on 8.5x11 paper, etc. It prints the paper ballot
> which is the official ballot of record.
>
> But here's the trick: we print TWO copies of the paper ballot.
>
> One is white and looks just like the demo ballot Alan has been using
> at speeches as a prop - but it's marked "BOX ONE" across the top, big
> letters.
>
> The other copy...well it could be produced by carbon, or from a second
> printer. Either way, it's visibly a different color, it's marked "BOX
> TWO", and it's got three pre-punched holes down one side so it can go
> in a binder later.
>
> And that's the key. "Box one" ballots go into that box, which goes
> back to county elections HQ. "Box two" end up in binders, one or two
> binders per precinct depending on turnout, precinct size, etc.
>
> The binders can be "checked out and inspected" at a county office by
> interested members of the public - in the same fashion, I can already
> go down to a county election office and say "show me the campaign
> finance binders for the mayor for 2003" or whatever.
>
> NOW the public can genuinely audit elections. They can spot check
> whatever precints they want, for at least 22 months post-election.
>
> As we got to this point, Bev got all happy and excited :).
>
> This is of course combined with everything else we've been plotting -
> the CD-R audit lots, hashed data and programs, etc.
>
> Granted, there's some extra costs. BUT the savings from running OVC
> gear vs. Diebold/ES&S/etc is so extreme it'll more than make up for
> the cost increase in paper handling which I would submit isn't that
> big a deal.
>
> The more I think about it, the more I think carbons or two-part forms
> from one printer are the answer. The counties are used to buying
> pre-printed ballots. These would be simpler - two sheets are
> produced, the only text on each are the "BOX ONE/BOX TWO" thing (or
> "BALLOT OF RECORD/PUBLIC AUDIT COPY" if you like), and it goes into
> one box to be separated later.
>
> What else...the "official copy" would be white to aid in OCR down the
> road. The "public view copy" for the binders would be a different color.
>
> Thoughts?
>
> Jim
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Received on Tue May 31 23:17:17 2005

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