Re: Crypto question: Hashing ultimate outputfor localuse

From: Ed Kennedy <ekennedyx_at_yahoo_dot_com>
Date: Mon May 02 2005 - 15:35:59 CDT

Hello Keith:

Respectfully, have you been a poll worker? Poll workers are generally elderly and retired folks. I've done a poll working gig and I have to back up Teresa here on the general ability level. Please give poll work a try yourself before assuming poll workers can do various things.

-- 
Thanks, Edmund R. Kennedy
Always work for the common good.
10777 Bendigo Cove
San Diego, CA 92126-2510
USA
I blog now and then at: <http://ekennedyx.blogspot.com/>
  ----- Original Message ----- 
  From: Teresa Hommel 
  To: K@copetech.com ; Open Voting Consortium discussion list 
  Sent: Monday, May 02, 2005 4:32 AM
  Subject: Re: [OVC-discuss] Crypto question: Hashing ultimate outputfor localuse
  You have poll workers who can't find the on-off button on the computer, etc. How are they going to accomplish this task with hashes?
  Teresa Hommel
  Keith Copenhagen wrote: 
    Hashing by itself is not a panacea, 
    You start with a public ovc generated set of hashes that verify the  starting point. 
    For each election then the people running the election generate the  original public 
    private key pair (PK) and create a CD that contains a signed set. 
    Then you build a web of trust (pyramid of delegation) based on PK the  propogates 
    out to the polling station, and then back to the tabulated record. 
    Correlating and verifying the integrity of the log(s), then allows you to  certify 
    the election.  If you have parallel signed logs (ie. 1 in the tabulator,  and 1 in 
    the operator's flash key) then it becomes virtually impossible to  successfuly tamper 
    with the data. 
    If you simply verify the hash at the polling place, then you run the risk  of an official 
    duplicating the CD and running a parallel election and submitting that CD. 
    -Keith 
    On Sun, 1 May 2005 21:23:14 -0700, Ed Kennedy <ekennedyx@yahoo.com> wrote: 
      Hello David: 
      All very well and good.  However, who would generate the Election Day  startup hash of the whole disk if it must be customized for every  election at every location?  This introduces the need for another  'trusted' (read NOT) person in the administrative process and therefore  another weak point. I think that you (all) are going to have to go with  modules. 
      Also, I think we're going to need some administrative process whereby  either all the poll workers or at least the poll captain signs off that  the hash they see is the one that was in the news paper. 
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Received on Tue May 31 23:17:12 2005

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