Re: Crypto question: Hashing ultimate output for localuse

From: Teresa Hommel <tahommel_at_earthlink_dot_net>
Date: Mon May 02 2005 - 06:32:29 CDT

You have poll workers who can't find the on-off button on the computer,
etc. How are they going to accomplish this task with hashes?
Teresa Hommel

Keith Copenhagen wrote:

> Hashing by itself is not a panacea,
> You start with a public ovc generated set of hashes that verify the
> starting point.
> For each election then the people running the election generate the
> original public
> private key pair (PK) and create a CD that contains a signed set.
> Then you build a web of trust (pyramid of delegation) based on PK the
> propogates
> out to the polling station, and then back to the tabulated record.
> Correlating and verifying the integrity of the log(s), then allows you
> to certify
> the election. If you have parallel signed logs (ie. 1 in the
> tabulator, and 1 in
> the operator's flash key) then it becomes virtually impossible to
> successfuly tamper
> with the data.
> If you simply verify the hash at the polling place, then you run the
> risk of an official
> duplicating the CD and running a parallel election and submitting that
> CD.
> -Keith
> On Sun, 1 May 2005 21:23:14 -0700, Ed Kennedy <>
> wrote:
>> Hello David:
>> All very well and good. However, who would generate the Election
>> Day startup hash of the whole disk if it must be customized for
>> every election at every location? This introduces the need for
>> another 'trusted' (read NOT) person in the administrative process
>> and therefore another weak point. I think that you (all) are going
>> to have to go with modules.
>> Also, I think we're going to need some administrative process
>> whereby either all the poll workers or at least the poll captain
>> signs off that the hash they see is the one that was in the news paper.

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Received on Tue May 31 23:17:05 2005

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