Re: Re: Ballot marking rules

From: David Mertz <voting-project_at_gnosis_dot_cx>
Date: Fri May 07 2004 - 22:09:51 CDT

On May 7, 2004, at 10:28 PM, Steve Chessin wrote:
> Based on <>, it seems you use
> "single" to mean "vote for 1 (only)". The cat catcher election is
> still one X per candidate, but you call that multi. Political
> scientists call it block vote.

Right, I shorten the phrases "single selection" and "multiple
selection." More or less coming from the way different GUI widgets are
named (pick lists, drop boxes, etc).

> <>.

I don't think so. At least as described on page 5 (actual page 13,
numbered as 5 after frontmatter) of your reference, it seems to
indicate "block vote" is a scoring rule, not a marking rule.

> I think you are confusing /marking/ rules with /scoring/ rules.

Nah... for this conversation, I have no interest at all in scoring
rules. They don't make any difference at all for the narrow question
of how much information is contained in a marked ballot.

> Cumulative voting is described at
> <>. There are N
> candidates
> for M seats. You have M votes that can be distributed amongst 1 to M
> candidates.

Your reference describes a couple different systems. What is called
"equal and even cumulative" amounts to the same thing as "multiple
selection" from a marking perspective. No more than one "X" goes next
to any one option.

The "Free cumulative" (which is also more about scoring than marking
per se) allows multiple votes for the same candidate. The example
given has five candidates and each voter given five "X"s. Is that a
uniform equality, or might the quantities be unequal (in both

(a) Might a voter have 20 votes to distribute among 5 candidates?
(b) Might a voter have 5 votes to distribute among 20 candidates?

> You get as many Xs as there are seats to be filled. There is no
> relation between the number of Xs and the number of candidates.

Oh, sorry, you answer my above questions. But I'm still not quite sure
if this is a universal description, or if some jurisdiction might
decide to have inequalities like those above. If not, why not? More
votes would seem to let a voter fine-tune preference weights better,
for example.

Yours, David...
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Received on Mon May 31 23:17:25 2004

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