Re: Please find evidence of >80bit election

From: Karl Auerbach <karl_at_cavebear_dot_com>
Date: Wed May 05 2004 - 12:24:53 CDT

> Btw. Possibly slightly contra Karl, I don't see a need for a whole lot
> of error correction in codes. A CRC can detect accidental corruption.
> But if a barcode goes bad, for whatever reason, the simple fallback is
> to require a manual examination of the printed content of the ballot.

Yes, that is quite true. But it will be expensive to do that kind of
manual examination. And if it were to occur during the early deployment
of the system it could result in states avoiding the system because of
perceived risks.

Bar codes (at least the 2D ones I looked at) have lots of error
countermeasures. So I'm not so concernerned about mis-scans.

What I am concerned about are errors in our software that result in
end-to-end introduction of errors. That's why I'm suggesting some sort of
checksum on the uncompacted, unencoded ballot data.

By-the-way, San Francisco is doing its first STV based election. This may
herald the increased use of ranked voting methods. That kind of thing
will certainly add a lot of bits to the data that has to be carried on the

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Received on Mon May 31 23:17:15 2004

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