Re: MORE Questions from election officials

From: David Mertz <voting-project_at_gnosis_dot_cx>
Date: Tue May 04 2004 - 16:48:29 CDT

|(5) Doe is asked if she/he would like this vote, for this "pin" number,
|to be the tabulated vote or to be recorded as a "faux" vote.

What if the bad guys have a spy on the inside who will leak the list of
real (paper) ballot-ids?

Still... even assuming there's an answer for that, I think the system
falls down on usability criteria. Voters don't want to go through all
the steps of creating a bunch of faux votes along with their real vote.

It might be worth it if there was really something that needed
protecting here. But I'm already quite happy with the procedural guards
in effect (poll watchers, canvassing guidelines, redundant storage and
reporting, etc). The problem of whether the real ballot made it to
central HQ is only a tiny piece of the puzzle (and HQ, if malicious and
unsupervised, might decide to count some faux votes instead, anyway);
it's not worth all the extra procedures.

|(5.a) When Doe chooses the "make this vote my 'real' vote" decision,
|that information is stored electronically in a seperate location, in
|some database, and the paper ballot is marked with his/her 'real' vote.

In a database that doesn't get corrupted, I assume? Neither hackers,
bad vendors, nor programming bugs mess up the database, right?


The broader point: There's no real purpose to letting voters make false
proofs of votes when everyone involved knows such false proofs are
possible. The bad guys know they are defeated in their buying/coercion
attempts, so they don't bother with the threats or bribes. But you
obtain the same protection by just not letting valid ballots leave the
polling place at all (nor links/codes to find copies later).

Yours, David...

Dred Scott 1857; Santa Clara 1876; Plessy 1892; Korematsu 1944; Eldred 2003
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Received on Mon May 31 23:17:12 2004

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