Re: MORE Questions from election officials

From: james_in_denver <james_in_denver_at_hotpop_dot_com>
Date: Tue May 04 2004 - 16:36:43 CDT

I do not wish to be redundant, if this topic has been resolved, then I
will apologize in advance. Here is a potential scenario that came to
mind while thinking some processes through:

(1) Voter Doe enters precinct and is given some piece of paper that is
perforated and has a unique identifying mark (watermark, bar-code, or
human readable number) on each portion of that piece of paper.

(2) Doe enters booth, inserts aforementioned piece of paper into voting

(3) Doe makes her/his choices via some input device.

(4) Doe is asked to create a "pin" number, of his/her own choosing for
this particular set of selections..

(5) Doe is asked if she/he would like this vote, for this "pin" number,
to be the tabulated vote or to be recorded as a "faux" vote.

(5.a) When Doe chooses the "make this vote my 'real' vote" decision,
that information is stored electronically in a seperate location, in
some database, and the paper ballot is marked with his/her 'real' vote.

(5.b) "Faux" votes are also stored in a similar manner, however the
ballot is not marked.

(6) If Doe desires he may return to step 3, and record as many "faux"
votes as desired.

(7) Doe leaves the voting booth, hands in his/her ballot, and receives
the torn off portion of the ballot bearing an identifying mark as noted
in (1) above.

(8) After polling is closed, all votes, 'faux' and 'real' COMBINED are
made available for review over the internet.

(9) Doe can visit several different coercers, and via the internet punch
in the number on the ballot receipt, enter the "pin" number noted above
(that Doe has memorized), and thus show the coercer, what that coercer
wanted to see.

(10) Doe can then go to any internet connection, enter the ballot stub
number, enter the pin he used for his 'real' vote as noted in (5.a)
above, and thereby verify that his vote was at least included in the
pool of votes to be tabulated.

The vast majority of voters would probably never need this level of
sophistication. However, it does solve problems related to a paper
"audit" trail of the voter's decisions, and provides the voter an
opportunity to review his voting record at a later time, free of any
form of coercion, and in some cases allows voters to profit from the
unwitting coercers noted above.

Technologically speaking, adding this "feature" to DRE with VVPB is a
trifling matter. Yet provides a few additional safe-gaurds over
paperless DRE or VVPB without a receipt.

>From the voter point of view, this is merely an added security
precaution. If any stranger found Doe's voting stub, they would still
need to have the "real" "pin" number to retrieve that persons voting

I admit this does nothing to secure the central tabulation mechanism,
but it gives the voter, at a minimum, the knowledge that yes, their vote
is in there somewhere. The security of the tabulation mechanism is
therefore highly critical, but certainly no more so than in DRE, or
receipt-less PPVB.

Just a thought....


On Tue, 2004-05-04 at 13:01, David Mertz wrote:
> On May 4, 2004, at 12:28 PM, Alan Dechert wrote:
> > I agree for now. There might be a 4th possibility--make it easy to
> > produce
> > counterfeit ballots that are duplicates of real ballots. There would
> > be no
> > danger of the counterfeits being counted since they are just copies of
> > one
> > ballot.
> Actually, OVC already does this:
> (1) Voter takes compact digital camera into voting booth
> (2) Voter takes picture of paper ballot before leaving booth
> (3a) Voter walks over to ballot box and deposits ballot ; or
> (3b) Voter walks to poll worker and says "this is a spoiled ballot"
> (and presumably then casts a new one)
> (4) Voter shows Coercer the snapshot
> I don't (yet) see any particular benefit in handing out the digital
> cameras to the voters ourselves (or anything equivalent) :-).
> Yours, David...

= The content of this message, with the exception of any external
= quotations under fair use, are released to the Public Domain
Received on Mon May 31 23:17:11 2004

This archive was generated by hypermail 2.1.8 : Mon May 31 2004 - 23:18:15 CDT