Re: MORE Questions from election officials

From: Alan Dechert <alan_at_openvotingconsortium_dot_org>
Date: Tue May 04 2004 - 11:28:16 CDT


> james_in_denver <> wrote:
> |So is there an easy way around the dilemma of either you can cast your
> |vote, and review it later to make certain that the vote tabulation
> |system is working and be susceptible to coercion, or you can vote
> |anonymously and only be able to verify that your vote was tabulate, but
> |not how it was tabulated? Which would be more important? Seems pretty
> |situational to me?
> Three options:
> (1) Give receipts, invite vote-coercion/buying.
> (2) No receipts, simple, tallying assurance is procedural/
> legal (OVC).
> (3) Anonymity preserving receipt (fact of vote, not content).
> Far less than 0.1% of voters can understand how it works
> (Chaum).
> The RIGHT answer is #2 :-).
I agree for now. There might be a 4th possibility--make it easy to produce
counterfeit ballots that are duplicates of real ballots. There would be no
danger of the counterfeits being counted since they are just copies of one
ballot. We discussed that some on this list. It was an incomplete thought.
A coercer could have no confidence who owns the real copy, but a voter (that
can remember the 4-digit ID #) would know.

Alan D.
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Received on Mon May 31 23:17:09 2004

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