Re: MORE Questions from election officials

From: charlie strauss <cems_at_earthlink_dot_net>
Date: Tue May 04 2004 - 09:22:44 CDT

Shamos says that crypto watermarks wont work as an anti-ballot box stuffing measure because the voter cant verify the mark is valid. He envisions the somewhat absurd case where if the voter votes for snidely whiplash it gives him a valid watermark and if the voter votes for dudley doright it gives him an invalid watermark (insert evil genius laugh here).

Ignoring that this would easily be caught by the very security measure he mentions elsewhere (voter tally), it also points up a unique feature of OVC.

OVC allows the user to verify on an independent machine that the barcode and any crypto watermark is valid.

-----Original Message-----
From: David Mertz <voting-project_at_gnosis_dot_cx>
On May 4, 2004, at 2:03 AM, james_in_denver wrote:
> 2.3 "The simplest form of paper ballot manipulation is ballot-box
> stuffing, that is, inserting extra ballots, usually genuine ones that
> have been pre-marked, into the container meant to hold only those voted
> by registered voters"

I would add here that Shamos assumes OVC systems will NOT have
cryptographic signatures incorporated into the paper ballots, nor other
fraud-protection counter-measures. Signatures, of course, are
associated with individual machines or with polling places, not with
individual voters (preserving anonymity).

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Received on Mon May 31 23:17:09 2004

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