From: Arthur Keller <arthur_at_kellers_dot_org>
Date: Sat Mar 20 2004 - 19:26:44 CST

At 2:22 PM -0500 3/20/04, David Mertz wrote:
>>A simulation of the poll-site voting machine is available on the Internet.
>>Users can print the same ballot as with the standalone voting machine, or
>>they can view the ballot on the screen.
>While this language is certainly fine for the press release, I think
>it's worthwhile for list members to keep in mind the slight
>inaccuracy here.
>In earlier discussion we covered the fact that a ballot should be
>customized for an individual polling place and election date to
>prevent ballot stuffing with pre-printed ballots. Specifically,
>there was some discussion of either varying the position of the
>ballot watermarks and/or attaching a cryptographic signature to the
>barcodes. If we do these things, we can identify any foreign ballot
>covertly inserted into a ballot box (including samples printed with
>Laird's internet interface). The internet ballot will be *almost*
>the same as an actual one, but not *exactly*.
>But most certainly the kind of cryptographic/security considerations
>I mention here would confuse reporters and politicians (at least at
>first blush). Still, for those members who will be at the demo, I
>think it is good to have the signing concept in mind--just in case
>an audience member asks about the issue. It's good to show we've
>thought of it.

Be careful that people don't confuse this with being able to vote
over the Internet, a far more serious issue.

Best regards,

Arthur M. Keller, Ph.D., 3881 Corina Way, Palo Alto, CA  94303-4507
tel +1(650)424-0202, fax +1(650)424-0424
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Received on Wed Mar 31 23:17:07 2004

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