From: David Mertz <voting-project_at_gnosis_dot_cx>
Date: Sat Mar 20 2004 - 13:22:59 CST

> A simulation of the poll-site voting machine is available on the
> Internet.
> Users can print the same ballot as with the standalone voting machine,
> or
> they can view the ballot on the screen.

While this language is certainly fine for the press release, I think
it's worthwhile for list members to keep in mind the slight inaccuracy

In earlier discussion we covered the fact that a ballot should be
customized for an individual polling place and election date to prevent
ballot stuffing with pre-printed ballots. Specifically, there was some
discussion of either varying the position of the ballot watermarks
and/or attaching a cryptographic signature to the barcodes. If we do
these things, we can identify any foreign ballot covertly inserted into
a ballot box (including samples printed with Laird's internet
interface). The internet ballot will be *almost* the same as an actual
one, but not *exactly*.

But most certainly the kind of cryptographic/security considerations I
mention here would confuse reporters and politicians (at least at first
blush). Still, for those members who will be at the demo, I think it
is good to have the signing concept in mind--just in case an audience
member asks about the issue. It's good to show we've thought of it.
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Received on Wed Mar 31 23:17:07 2004

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