Fwd: Please forward this message

From: Arthur Keller <voting_at_kellers_dot_org>
Date: Mon Jun 26 2006 - 12:39:19 CDT

>From: "David L. Dill" <dill@cs.stanford.edu>
>Reply-to: dill@cs.stanford.edu
>To: ovc-discuss-owner@listman.sonic.net
>Subject: Please forward this message
>Date: Mon, 26 Jun 2006 09:59:34 -0700
>Sender: mailman-bounces@lists.sonic.net
>------- Forwarded Message
>From: "David L. Dill" <dill@cs.stanford.edu>
>To: kathy@electionarchive.org
>cc: utahcv@uscountvotes.org, uscv_voting_activists@uscountvotes.org,
> utah_election_officials@uscountvotes.org, election@uscountvotes.org,
> utahcv_press@uscountvotes.org, uscv_blogs@uscountvotes.org,
> uscv_press@uscountvotes.org, "Open Voting Consortium discussion list"
> <ovc-discuss@listman.sonic.net>,
> utahcv_computer_scientists@uscountvotes.org
>Subject: Mis-statement of Verified Voting's position
>In-Reply-To: Your message of "Mon, 26 Jun 2006 00:34:15 MDT."
> <391f105b0606252334j65e3eaedk3acdc5cfb3e082e7@mail.gmail.com>
>Date: Mon, 26 Jun 2006 09:58:35 -0700
>Sender: dill@chicory.Stanford.EDU
>You have COMPLETELY misrepresented Verified Voting's position, which
>was first stated, very clearly, in the Resolution on Electronic Voting
>that I wrote in January, 2003 (see
>"Of course, use of appropriate equipment is not sufficient to guarantee
> election integrity. Elections must be administered to minimize the
> possibility of error and fraud, and maximize the likelihood of detecting
> them if they occur. In particular, even with an audit trail, audits must
> actually be conducted. If electronic counts are used from machines that also
> print ballots, or if paper ballots are counted electronically, manual
> recounts must be conducted with enough frequency to make the detection of
> error or fraud likely."
>In every piece of legislation where we've been consulted (and that's a
>LOT of bills, at the Federal and state level), we have fought for the
>inclusion of provisions requiring random audits and precedence of
>voter-verified paper over electronic records. I question whether
>other resolutions, such as the League of Women Voters, would be as
>clear as they are on these points if we hadn't repeated the message
>over and over for years.
>I won't speak for Common Cause, except to note that the
>recommendations in their recent report clearly support HR 550, which
>contains both of these provisions, and for random manual audits.
>Please issue a correction.
> David Dill
> Founder of VerifiedVoting.org and the Verified Voting Foundation.
>> This resolution puts the US League of Women Voters in the very forefront of
>> the effort to fix American democracy because, unlike some other prominent
>> nation-wide "election integrity" groups, the US League of Women Voters
>> recognizes that:
>> 1. voter-verified paper ballots are insufficient in themselves unless some
>> of them are hand-counted in audits that check the machine counts, and
>> 2. the paper ballot should be the official record (not the electronic
>> ballot).
>> I hope that other election integrity groups such as VerifiedVoting and
>> CommonCause which have endorsed voter-verifiable paper ballots (VVPBs) but
>> neglected to sufficiently point out that VVPBs, without being counted in
>> independent audits, are no more than a false assurance to voters and leave
>> the risk for malfeasance and error high, will now follow the example of the
>> US League of Women Voters.
>> Without independent audits, any voting system is wide-open to error and
> > tampering.
>------- End of Forwarded Message

Arthur M. Keller, Ph.D., 3881 Corina Way, Palo Alto, CA  94303-4507
tel +1(650)424-0202, fax +1(650)424-0424
OVC-discuss mailing list
= The content of this message, with the exception of any external 
= quotations under fair use, are released to the Public Domain    
Received on Fri Jun 30 23:17:11 2006

This archive was generated by hypermail 2.1.8 : Fri Jun 30 2006 - 23:17:12 CDT