Use of audit/copies in event of loss of original ballots

From: james_in_denver <james_in_denver_at_hotpop_dot_com>
Date: Tue Jun 29 2004 - 01:14:27 CDT


Thanks for the feedback. I must say that this is a fairly subtle
distintion. It will most likely only arise if/when the veracity of OVC's
software is challenged.

I think that acceptance of the validity of the "redundancy of
representation" may be an issue if/when faced with the loss and or
destruction of the original ballots.

Does anyone have a "feel" for how the Judiciary might interpret "copies"
or "audit records" acting as "substitutes" of ballots when faced with
the (at some point likely) absence of originially recorded ballots? Does
anyone know if this issue has been addressed legislatively?

To the best of my knowledge, no "Assembly/Legal Body" has addressed the
issue of using "copies" or "audit records" as being valid substitutes in
the event of loss/destruction/absence of the original "ballots". Any
legislation authorizing use of "copies" or "audit records" as
substitutes for lost "ballots" would certainly validate OVC's model. Is
that possible/likely though?

James Acomb

On Mon, 2004-06-28 at 05:12, Arthur Keller wrote:
> I agree with James' analysis here and with his PS. But note that the
> redundancy of representation is a feature in our system, not a bug.
> The multiple copies of the information is a key part of what makes
> the process auditable.
> Best regards,
> Arthur
> At 1:24 AM -0400 6/28/04, james_in_denver wrote:
> >This raises a couple of issues that I am not certain have been
> >completely addressed or agreed upon.
> >
> >The OVC model is proposing three distinct indications of voter
> >selections:
> >
> >1) The printed ballot, indicating via human readable, printed
> >characters, each voters' selections.
> >
> >2) A barcode on the printed ballot indicating a machine/computer
> >generated, and a machine/computer readable, summary of the actual text
> >contained on the printed ballot.
> >
> >3) An electronically stored record (removable media, network, whatever)
> >record of the voter's selections.
> >
> >Only ONE of these three options can serve as the "official" ballot. The
> >other two choices are merely convenient for tabulating the ballot and/or
> >acting as an audit trail for the "official" ballot (indication of voter
> >selections intententions). If we do not adequately address this issue,
> >then it will become a matter for the judiciary to decide and rule upon,
> >on the first ocassion that the OVC system is challenged. Understanding
> >that at some point in time a challenge to the OVC software and/or model
> >will be made, it is perhaps best to decide this issue sooner, rather
> >than later.
> >
> >IMHO,
> >
> >James,
> >
> >PS: I am supportive of the "Human Readable" printed ballot serving as
> >the "official" representation of voters' choices. The electronically
> >stored record serving as an audit of the printed ballot, and the barcode
> >serving as a convience for tabulation/"tracking" purposes.

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Received on Wed Jun 30 23:17:25 2004

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