Re: Summary paper ballot

From: David Mertz <voting-project_at_gnosis_dot_cx>
Date: Mon Jun 28 2004 - 02:25:08 CDT

james_in_denver <> wrote:
|The OVC model is proposing three distinct indications of voter
|1) The printed ballot, indicating via human readable
|2) A barcode on the printed ballot
|3) An electronically stored record

It has ALWAYS been the OVC design that the human readable printed ballot
is the official, legal ballot. That's the fundamental meaning of Voter
Verified Paper Ballot.

See my discussion at for
some clarification on this.

We may or may not use a barcode at all. I tend to lean against them
now, having thought more about covert channels, and about the
*perception* of possible covert channels especially. But even those who
like the barcodes the most see them as a technological convenience to
improve scanning speed/accuracy, not as a fundamental design goal.

In any case, ballots must be randomly checked to give us statistical
confidence threshholds about the accurate correspondence between
barcodes and human readable votes.

EBIs likewise are only there for audit checks. We check the unofficial
EBIs against the official paper ballots only to catch a category of
error. For example, it's a (limited) guard against improoer destruction
of ballots and/or ballot-box stuffing. Of course, we can't pretend the
existence of paper ballots that are missing, but if the (apparent rate
of missing ballots is high, that raises red flags). A low rate of
missing paper ballots is inevitable, since some voters will fail to put
their ballot in the ballot-box (intentionally or by mistake, hopefully
primarily by intention).
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Received on Wed Jun 30 23:17:24 2004

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